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Abstract
This research focuses on the role played by human capital in explaining cross-country
productivity differences, and also in shaping the world allocation of capital stocks. The
central question of the first essay is- what determines whether a country is better at using
some technologies than others? A widely held view is that a country’s ability to absorb
and implement technologies is tied to its human capital. In this chapter, we construct a
novel specification of technology that incorporates this idea. Countries are comprised of
a range of industries with heterogeneous productivities. In high human capital countries,
productivity is maximized for industries with the most sophisticated technologies, while in
low human capital countries, productivity is maximized for industries with less sophisticated
technologies. A key result is that both aggregate total factor productivity and the industrial
structure of an economy are driven by inter-industry variations in productivity which in turn
is a function of human capital. We embed this specification within a standard production
function framework and undertake a development accounting exercise. Our results indicate
that almost half of the variation in aggregate TFP differences can be explained by the
distribution of inter-industry TFP.
The second essay models the entry of foreign multinationals within the technology-skill
complementarity framework. Foreign and domestic firms engage in a Bertrand competition
over each industry. The equilibrium solution of the model yields the threshold industry
starting from which foreign firms edge out domestic firms. Interest rates are endogenously
determined within the model and this allows us to observe the extent to which the inter-
national capital markets are globalized. Our findings suggest that financial markets are
characterized by imperfect capital mobility. Therefore we carry out a hypothetical experi-
ment by analyzing the reallocation of the world capital stock under perfect capital mobility.
vi
The third essay evaluates the local conditions that are required for FDI to bring positive
effects on growth and it consists of a unified study of absorptive capacities. We analyze
the simultaneous interactions of FDI with other growth determinants and their effect on
the contribution of FDI on the growth rate of GDP per capita. Our findings suggest that
FDI can have significant contribution to economic growth, but its presence in developing




Over the past decade, a vast part of the literature on economic growth has shown that the
enormous cross-country differences in GDP per worker can be pinned down to total factor
productivity (TFP) differences.
The first chapter of this dissertation is focused on explaining aggregate TFP differences
through a novel formulation of technology that incorporates the concept of technology-skill
complementarity. We analyze the extent to which skill abundance explains productivity
differences across countries and we examine the role played by human capital in shaping the
industrial structure of an economy.
The central question addressed in the first essay is: why do some countries not use
all technologies that are available, especially the latest ones? To answer this question,
we start from the observation that technologies differ not only across countries, but also
across industries, within a country. Also, some industries require inherently more human
capital than others. Therefore, poor countries that are scarce in human capital are more
efficient in producing in low-tech industries that do not require high levels of skills. Rich
countries that are abundant in human capital, on the other hand, favor hi-tech industries
that are skill intensive. In other words, a country’s human capital endowment determines
which industries are “appropriate”. Thus this technology-skill complementarity shapes the
distribution of productivities across industries within a country.
The theoretical model presents a new formulation for technology consisting of three
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components: an industry specific component, a skill complementary component and finally
a homogeneous, industry neutral component. A consequence of this formulation is that a
country will choose to concentrate its production in certain industries and less in others
depending on its human capital. We calibrate the equilibrium solution of the model and
under plausible parameter values, it turns out that human capital is the engine behind TFP
differences and it shapes the entire industrial structure of an economy. The exercise shows
that almost half of the variation in aggregate TFP can be explained by the variation of
inter-industry TFP. The results show that cross-country income gaps are driven by TFP
differences and more importantly, TFP differences are explained by inter-industry variation
in productivities.
The second chapter of this thesis analyzes the allocation of the world capital stock using
the technology-skill complementarity framework presented in Chapter 2 but deviating from
the closed economy structure. We model the entry of foreign multinationals in an economy
starting from the fact that the heterogeneity of productivities across industries gives rise to
foreign direct investments in domestic markets in which foreign firms have a technological
advantage. The endogenous determination of interest rates allows us to observe the distri-
bution of the world supply of capital stock and to calculate endogenously the FDI inflows for
each country considered which is a function of each country’s human capital endowments.
Since our findings suggest that the rates of return to capital investments (or marginal prod-
uct of capital) differ across countries we conclude that the international financial markets
are characterized by imperfect capital mobility. We then carry out a simulation exercise by
imposing equalization on MPK to see how the optimal distribution of world capital stock
would look if capital was allowed to move freely across countries. As a result of MPK equal-
ization, the capital stock would dramatically increase by 120% in the average less developed
country. Also,under perfect capital mobility, the world output would increase by 3%.
The third chapter analyzes the necessary local conditions required for the existence of
positive spillovers from multinationals’ entry. We start from the idea that FDI is a channel
through which less developed countries gain access to advanced technologies. In this sense,
FDI speeds up the diffusion of technologies across countries. Yet, the question that arises
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is: to what extent are these advanced technologies absorbed and successfully internalized
by the receiving countries such that they materialize in welfare gains? The impact of FDI
depends on the country specific absorptive capacity that consists of local conditions favorable
to economic growth. We first interact FDI individually with different growth determinants
and we find that the contribution of FDI to economic growth is positive and significant
depending on the level of human capital and development of financial markets. Then we
test the robustness of the linear interaction terms relative to each other and we analyze the




and International TFP Differences
2.1 Introduction
The standard of living in U.S. is estimated to be about 20 times higher than the standard
of living in Kenya. What are the roots behind these enormous income differences across
countries? As Robert Lucas eloquently put it, “Once one starts to think about [these
questions], its hard to think about anything else.”1. This key question has led to an explosion
in the field of economic growth over the past two decades. Over the past decade, this body of
research has increasingly shown that total factor productivity (or the “residual”) differences
account for most of the cross-country differences in GDP per worker.2 While this is an
important step forward, the fact remains that TFP is a proximate determinant and not a
fundamental determinant of average incomes. Moreover, exercises that tend to emphasize
the primacy of TFP do not always incorporate the role of human capital in shaping it.
In this chapter we pay particular attention to the role of what one might call appropriate
human capital. In particular, we revisit the question - are all countries equally good at using
all technologies? The trivial answer to this is no. The view of a uniform technology within
an economy that diffuses instantly across all industries is hardly a depiction of reality. Agri-
culture does not use the same technology as the software industry. Furthermore, within each
1See Lucas (1988)
2See Hall and Jones(1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). Both papers argue that a substantial
variation in GDP per worker is due to differences in TFP as opposed to factors of production (mainly physical
and human capital). Subsequent research, however, has tried to reinstate the primacy of human capital.
See Seshadri and Manuelli (2005).
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industry, different technologies will have different skill requirements. Since each country has
its own skill endowments, some industries will be more productive in one country than in
another. The subsequent question is, what determines whether a country is better at using
some technologies than others? Here, we model the idea that a country is best suited to
produce some specific technologies that complement its human capital. To fix ideas, we
can think of ranking countries in terms of their human capital. At the same time, we can
also rank technologies in terms of their increasing sophistication. One can argue that more
sophisticated technologies tend to be more productive when used with higher amounts of
human capital. Less sophisticated technologies are not necessarily more productive when
used with high levels of human capital. For instance, poor countries that are less abundant
in human capital are not efficient in producing the latest IT equipment and software. Con-
versely, these countries might be efficient in producing textiles or agricultural products that
traditionally require less human capital. While these observations are in themselves not new,
we implement a novel mechanism to capture these ideas, and relate them to comparisons of
aggregate TFP undertaken in the literature.
We model total factor productivity as comprising three distinct components. First, there
is a sector neutral national homogeneous TFP component, a common assumption in the
literature. This can reflect the overall ease with which technologies can enter an economy,
or other aspects of efficiency that are not necessarily technology specific. Second, we allow
for variation in technology levels across industries within a country. Thus, while we adopt a
product variety framework for intermediate inputs, we allow the productivity of intermediate
inputs to vary. Third, and the crucial innovation in our setup, is the introduction of a human
capital driven technology component. In particular, within different varieties, there are some
for which productivity is highest, given the country’s current human capital level relative to
the remaining varieties. Thus, the third component gives some industries within a country
a productivity advantage over other industries. To get an initial idea of how the last two
features interact, consider Figure 2.1.
Here industries are indexed along 0 to 1, with industry 0 using the least sophisticated










I   Human capital component for a poor country
    (low level of human capital)
II  Human capital component for a rich country
    (high level of human capital)
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of the components of technology across industries
point in time it is feasible for a whole range of industries to exist. In Figure 2.1 Panel A,
this inter-industry variation in technology which is independent of human capital is depicted
by line III. Now consider two countries with different levels of human capital per worker.
For the country with a low level human capital (line I), the human capital specific aspect
of productivity is maximized at an industry with a low degree of sophistication and for the
country with high human capital level (line II), this is maximized at an industry with a higher
degree of sophistication. The human capital component of productivity is then multiplied
by the industry specific productivity of each country (line III). The product of the two is
depicted in Figure 2.1 Panel B. In our benchmark model, this distribution of industry specific
TFP becomes a component of aggregate TFP. Finally, though not depicted, for each of the
countries, this is further multiplied by the national homogeneous TFP level.
A few important inferences can be made right away. First, note that the manner in which
lines I and II are drawn suggest that poor countries are really disadvantaged in producing
sophisticated goods. However, rich countries are not as disadvantaged in producing less
sophisticated goods. This asymmetry does appeal to one’s intuition. A relatively uneducated
worker in a poor country will not have the capabilities to operate hi-tech equipment which
requires substantial investments of time and costs in human capital. On the other hand
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it is conceivable that a highly educated worker, with some training, can start working in
an industry that does not require much human capital.3 Secondly, note that for some
industries (the less sophisticated ones), the poor country shown by line 1 in Figure 2.1 Panel
B is actually more productive than the rich country. However, we still need to multiply
these with the homogeneous TFP component and if the differences in the latter are large
enough across countries then the first two components may be less relevant.
This quantitative question is addressed in the second part of the chapter. We calibrate
the equilibrium solution of the model by using a standard development accounting approach
in order to back out our measure for aggregate TFP (which is a product of all three com-
ponents). We undertake a variance decomposition exercise and we find that differences in
aggregate TFP explain 62% of variation in GDP per worker. More importantly, we also
calculate the contribution of the non-homogeneous components of TFP in the variation of
aggregate TFP. We infer that the former accounts for 41% of the variation in the latter.
This is a fairly large number and it underscores the importance of what others have referred
to as “technology-skill” complementarity.4
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model where we
emphasize the new formulation for technology and its importance in the construction of TFP.
In section 2.3 we describe the calibration methodology and we use different measures for
human capital in a variance decomposition exercise similar to Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997). Section 2.4 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our approach constructs a link between two strands of the literature. First, we take into
account the recent findings of the vast literature of appropriate technology and skill biased
technological differences. The idea of a country being better at using technologies specific
to its capital-labor ratios dates back to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969). Basu and Weil (1996)
further build upon this concept of “appropriate technology” in a learning-by-doing model
3The cliche of the “overqualified worker” comes to mind.
4See Goldkin and Katz (1998).
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where improvements in technology are localized and tied to capital-labor ratios. While
our current version of the model is a static one, it is easy to see that the distribution of
technologies across inputs could ultimately be a function of localized learning by doing albeit
based on human capital rather than capital-labor ratios.
Closest to this chapter, however are Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Acemoglu and Zili-
botti (2001). Using a model of endogenous technological choice, Caselli and Coleman show
that technologies chosen by different countries are not identical because of the existence of
technological skill bias: poor countries choose technologies that complement unskilled labor,
while rich countries (skilled labor abundant) favor the use of technologies that complement
skilled labor. However, the structure in this chapter is more general in the sense that since
technologies themselves are partly endogenous to human capital, it provides a theory for
where technological differences come from without having to estimate production possibility
frontiers. Further, since we allow for a continuum of goods, the model can provide some
theoretical implications regarding the diversification in the structure of production. Finally,
in principle, the model can allow for a joint endogenous evolution of human capital and tech-
nological change- something we explore in a separate paper. Nevertheless, the two essays
should be viewed as complementary.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) point out that some technologies might be inappropriate
for poorer, less skill abundant countries, since the new technologies from rich countries
are meant to be used by skilled workers. They find that income disparity arises because
of “technology-skill mismatch” where skill scarce countries are forced to adopt some skill
biased technologies ultimately leading to lower productivity. However ex-ante this is quite
different from our chapter since we do not have any such skill mismatch and skill-scarce
countries choose to focus on less sophisticated technologies in equilibrium. Nevertheless, it
is easy to see that one could get the same outcome if we introduced distortions in our model
which would lead to an inefficient production structure. Again, this is obviously something
that is true in reality (whether one thinks of urban bias or agricultural protection) and is a
future extension that we plan to work on.
Finally, we connect the above conclusions to the findings of the emerging literature of
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inter-sectoral linkages. The view is that sectoral composition and the ties between sectors
create a multiplier effect reflected in TFP differences.5 Jones (2008) builds a model of
linkages across intermediate goods starting from the premise that intermediate goods enter
the final good production in a complementary fashion. The idea is that weak links, i.e.,
industries with low productivity will cause even lower productivities in subsequent industries.
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) stress that missallocation of inputs at the firm level highly affects
TFP. By using micro data they quantify this impact by constructing a measure for within
industry TFP for manufacturing sectors in China, India and United States.
2.2 Model
We consider a discrete-time model with a representative infinitely lived consumer who
maximize utility over a final homogeneous good. In addition to the final good, there is
a continuum of intermediate inputs which in conjunction with capital produce the final
good. The intermediate inputs are produced using skilled labor and unskilled labor. The
key innovation is, of course, the construction of the technology for each of these varieties
which we shall discuss in detail later. In this section we solve for equilibrium GDP which
in turn depends upon the equilibrium allocation of endowments across industries. Using
this equilibrium allocation, we derive expressions for aggregate TFP, and its inter-industry
component.
5Chanda and Dalgaard (2007) also show that the allocation of inputs between agricultural and non-
agricultural sector has a significant impact on TFP levels and provide evidence that the resulting relative
efficiency between sectors accounts for 85% of international variation of TFP. They indicate that structural
differences are as important as technological differences in explaining TFP disparity. Caselli (2005) notes
that without sectorial differences, income disparity would be reduced to one third of its actual level and as
long as these sectorial differences matter, it might be wiser to focus on barriers to mobility of inputs across




Perfectly competitive firms produce a homogeneous final good by combining capital and a






Xαitdi, 0 < α < 1, (2.1)
where KY t is the capital used in the production of final goods at time t, Xit is the amount of
intermediate good i used in final good production at time t and α is the share of intermediate
good i in total output. From here on, we eliminate the time subscripts unless otherwise
noted.
Final good producers maximize their profits:




where r is the interest rate and d is the depreciation rate. To simplify matters, we as-
sume that from now on the depreciation rate is 1. Further, we set the final good as the
numeraire good, with PY = 1. First order conditions imply that the conditional demand













The intermediate goods sector consists of a continuum of differentiated varieties i that are
indexed from 0 to 1.The composite intermediate good is obtained by aggregating all varieties






Monopolistic competition characterizes the market setting of each variety i. Before entering
the market, a potential entrant needs to make an up-front investment to acquire the appro-
priate technology A(i, h) for variety i. Each variety i is produced by a single firm according
to the following production function:





where Li and Hi represent the amount of unskilled and skilled labor used in the production
of variety i and δ is the share of unskilled labor.6






Lidi = L (2.6)
where L and H represent the fixed supply of total unskilled and skilled labor in the economy.
Technology
We assume that technology is country specific, variety specific, and human capital spe-
cific. All of these can be captured using the following functional form,







• B is the country-specific productivity index at time t (sector neutral homogeneous
component) that grows at an exogenous rate φ.
• eµi is the variety specific component of technology that reflects the sophistication of






)2 is the human capital specific component of technology, where the appropriate
human capital h = H
H+L
describes the country-specific human capital intensity.
6Labor inputs enter indirectly in the production of final goods, through the composite intermediate good
X. Each intermediate good i is used as an input in the production of final good and embodies unskilled
and skilled labor. Adding labor in the production function of final goods would not change our equilibrium
results. However, to eliminate this caveat, in the empirical part we calibrate the labor-income share to
realistic values (i.e., 2/3).
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of technologies. Panel (A): across countries; Panel (B): across
industries
The human capital component captures the distribution of technologies across countries
and across industries. On one hand, by holding i constant (i = i∗), A(i, h) as a function of
h describes the log normal distribution of technologies across countries within industry i∗
(see Figure 2.2 Panel A). Thus, skill intensity h shapes the appropriate technology A(i, h)
for a given industry i∗. Moreover, the highest technology for i∗ is developed by the country
that satisfies h = i∗. For h < i∗, A(i∗, h) is increasing in h suggesting that technologies and
skills are complements. This relationship is switched if h > i∗, in the sense that technology
and skill endowments are substitutes (A(i∗, h) is decreasing in h).
On the other hand, by holding h constant (h = h∗), and letting A(i, h) vary with respect
to i only, we get the distribution of technologies across industries i ∈ [0, 1] within a country
(see Figure 2.2 Panel B). In other words, each industry has its own appropriate technology
based on the country specific human capital intensity. The substitutability/complementarity
between technology and skills can be seen once again in Figure 2.2 Panel B: the same increase
in h has different effects on A(i, h) depending on the location of i within the range: for a
simple variety (i → 0), the A(i,h) will decline (movement from A to B) suggesting that A(i, h)
and h are substitutes, while for a complex variety(i → 1) the A(i, h) will rise (movement
from C to D) i.e., A(i, h) and h are complements.
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The decision to enter industry i is made in two stages:
Stage 1: Free-entry condition
The up-front investment in A(i, h) represents a setup cost Fi to each potential entrant.
Thus, Fi as a barrier to entry characterizes each industry i. In period t the potential entrant
makes the investment in A(i, h) and enter the market if the present value (as of t) of future
monopoly profits exceeds the entry costs. Let Vt =
πt+1
1+r
be the present discounted value of
future profits as of time t. If Vt > Fit then the firm enters the market for i. In equilibrium,




Stage 2: In period t + 1, the firm makes all pricing and output decisions that maximize its
monopolistic profits.
Given (2.5), the cost function of the producer of variety i is:









Each monopolist maximizes its profits each period:
max π(i) = piXi − C(wLi , wHi , Xi)
The first order conditions give the optimal price charged by the monopolist, which represents
a standard markup of 1
α












as well as the nominal wages wLi and wHi :
wLi = δα




wHi = (1 − δ)α
2 A(i, h)α Li
αδ Hi
(1−δ)α−1 (2.11)
Therefore, all pricing and output decisions of the firm are influenced by A(i, h). Equations
















Next, using equations (2.9) and (2.12) we solve for profits πi in order to back out Fi from






















Equation (2.13) implies that the entry costs Fi are an increasing function of the appropriate
technology A(i, h). Summing up the setup costs from all industries i ∈ [0, 1], we get total

























The economy has a large number (N) of infinitely lived consumers and zero population










where β > 0 is the discount rate, σ > 0 is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion and u(Ct) is the objective function.
Consumers’ budget constraint is given by:
Dt+1 = Ct + wHHt + wLLt + (1 + r)Dt,
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where Dt represents total asset holdings at time t, wHH + wLL is the wage income, and r
is the interest rate. Ct is consumption of the final good which is the choice variable, while
Dt+1 is the state variable-a stock variable that reflects assets inherited from the past.
The solution of the Bellman equation from below gives the optimal path for consumption
and investment:
V (Dt) = [u(Ct) + V (Dt+1)] ,
where V (Dt) describes the value function that represents the objective function u(Ct) max-





















= [β(1 + r)]
1
σ − 1 (2.17)
2.2.3 General Equilibrium
We present a decentralized equilibrium solution of the model in which firms are maxi-
mizing their profits, consumers are maximizing their utility and inputs and output markets
clear. Equilibrium is defined by the following conditions:
1. Y = C + I








The second condition explains that investments in the final goods sector, KY , and invest-
ments in appropriate technologies made in the intermediate goods sector, KX , sum up to
total capital in the economy K. Each period K fully depreciates, thus Kt+1 = It = Yt −Ct,
where It is total amount of investments and Ct is consumption at time t. The third condition
15
reflects labor market equilibrium implying that the labor employed by all industries add up
to the total labor supply.
In equilibrium, nominal wages are equalized such that wLi = wL and wHi = wH for
i ∈ (0, 1). Using (2.10) and (2.11) the variety specific demands for unskilled labor Li and































In order to derive wL and wH as functions of skill endowments and technologies, we substitute
the above equations into the labor market equilibrium conditions. Thus equilibrium nominal























Next, we substitute the equilibrium nominal wages from (4.9) and (4.10) into the explicit
demand of Xi given by (2.12). We can now substitute the explicit demand for intermediates
Xi into the production function of the aggregate output from (2.1). Thus in equilibrium,
aggregate income is:















Equation (2.20) already suggests the causes of income disparities: part of Y is determined
by factors of accumulation, while the other part is governed by appropriate technologies.
According to the previous literature, this other part represents TFP.
In order to get a cleaner expression for TFP, denote g(i) = A(i, h)
α

































Thus, aggregate income can now be expressed as:















































di capture inter-industry TFP. Then aggregate income from
(4.14) becomes7:
Y = K1−αY L
αδ Hα(1−δ)Bαt Z
1−α (2.22)
Next, we solve for KX . In a similar fashion as for solving for Y , we substitute the nominal














After substituting the interest rate from (2.25) into the above equation, we get KX = αKY




Finally, we close the model by solving for the endogenous interest rate r. Along BGP, all
variables grow at constant rates (i.e., gK , gY , and gC are constant). Therefore, the growth
rate of capital-output ratio is zero on BGP, which implies that gK = gY . Since total capital
7Although technology does not appear in the production function of the final good, however, aggregate











is given by K = KX(
1+α
α






















































gK = (1 + φ)
α
− 1 (2.24)





therefore gK = gC . Using (2.17) and (2.24) we back out
the interest rate r:
r =




The purpose of our empirical exercise is to address the following question: to what extent
do differences in inter-industry TFP explain differences in aggregate TFP? If inter-industry
TFP matters, then its importance should be reflected in aggregate TFP, and our goal is to
quantify the contribution of the former in the variation of the latter. Moreover, if inter-
industry TFP turns out to be important then the results would emphasize the role played
by appropriate human capital in driving cross-country income differences.
But first, before answering the above question, we test the significance of our theoretical
model by comparing its predictions to the standard results of Hall and Jones (1999). We
carry out a variance decomposition exercise for output per worker similar to the one presented
in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).





























α represents the inter-industry component in per worker terms. Equation (2.26)
captures the double role played by h: the appropriate human capital has a direct effect on
income per worker (as a factor of production), and an indirect effect through TFP.
2.3.1 Data
Data for GDP per worker (y), investment shares and population are extracted from Penn
World Tables 6.2 that use 2000 as the base year. Capital stocks (K) are calculated by using
the perpetual inventory approach.
The construction of human capital is the essential piece of our empirical exercise. In this
sense, we use two sources of data. First, Barro and Lee (2001) provide data for educational
attainment for population aged 15 and over. They break each country’s labor force into
seven categories of educational attainment: no schooling, some primary, primary completed,
some secondary, secondary completed, some higher, and higher completed. Second, Caselli
and Coleman (2006) report the durations of primary and secondary education as well as
the private returns from schooling for each country considered. Based on these datasets,
we construct different measures for human capital by using the Mincerian approach. The
standard Mincerian wage regression states that there is a linear relationship between the
log of wage and the returns from schooling. Specifically, log wi = β0 + β1 λi + ǫi, where
λi represents average years of schooling for individual i. The coefficient β1 captures the
Mincerian private returns to schooling and reflects a 100 β1% increase in wage coming from
an additional year of schooling.














where S1,S2,...,S7 are the fractions of labor force N that have no schooling, some primary
education, ...,completed higher education. β is the country-specific private return to educa-
tion and λ1,...,λ7 are the durations in years of each educational level for a given country.
8
Since there is a disparity across countries in terms of duration of educational levels, we
rescale L and H based on the fact that in our set of countries, the shortest length of primary
education is four years and six years for secondary education. Therefore, we multiply H by
eβ(λ3+λ5−10).
The next question that arises is where to place the threshold i, i.e, what constitutes
unskilled labor and what human capital? We choose the secondary completed level of at-
tainment as the boundary between unskilled and skilled labor. Then, considering the workers
who completed secondary education as the reference group, we express H in “secondary com-
pleted equivalents”, while L is expressed in “no schooling equivalents”(Caselli and Coleman
(2006)). Alternatively, we consider the scenario where human capital consists of workers
who have completed some higher education and above.
To calibrate the model we use empirical estimates for parameters α, δ, and µ. For the
share of capital in aggregate output we set (1− α) = 1
3
(see Gollin (2002)). Following Basu
(1996), the monopolist’s mark-up over marginal cost is estimated to be 10%. Accordingly,
we set δ - the share of unskilled labor in the composite intermediate good equal to 0.5.
The sophistication of each variety - µ captures the idea that productivities are increasing
exponentially with complexity (Jones (2008)). For each country, we initially set µ = 1 which
implies that the inter-industry TFP of the 90th percentile relative to the inter-industry TFP
of the 10th percentile is 2.2. Later on, we undertake a sensitivity analysis and set µ = 0.5
and µ = 1.5 which imply a 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP of 1.5 and 3.3, respectively.
8From Caselli and Coleman (2006) we have country specific durations of primary and secondary education.
For subgroups that did not complete the respective levels of study (some primary, some secondary, some
higher), we use, as they did, half of the duration of that level.
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2.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the equilibrium solution of the model given by (2.26) using a cross-section
of 51 countries for the year 2000.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the data. GDP per worker (y), capital
output ratio (K
Y
), and human capital intensity (h = H
H+L
) are calculated as ratios to the
U.S. values. The data reflect huge income dispersion across countries: Kenya, the country
with the lowest standard of living from our sample of countries, has 4.9% of U.S.’ GDP per
worker. Output per worker in the richest country (Singapore) is around 24 times higher than
in the least developed country. The two poorest countries (Kenya and Ghana) have also
the lowest levels of human capital per worker (about 5% of the U.S.’ level), which implies a
20-fold difference. Also, the group of four countries with highest levels of human capital per
worker H
N
(U.S., Canada, Sweden, South Korea) are also the most intensive in appropriate
human capital h.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Data
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
y 0.371 0.272 0.048 1.158
K
Y
0.886 0.348 0.347 1.819
h 0.409 0.244 0.035 1.036
We explore the relationship between our measure of human capital and Hall and Jones’
estimates for human capital per worker. Human capital per worker (H
N
) has a correlation of
0.84 (not shown here) with Hall and Jones’ values that are based on a 1985 dataset.Also,
Figure 2.3 suggests a strong positive correlation between our measure for appropriate human
capital h and Hall and Jones’ estimates for human capital per worker.
To calculate inter-industry TFP (Z in our calibration equation), we approximate numer-
ically the definite integral under Z by using the quadratic interpolation method (Simpson
rule). After taking logs of the levels, we back out lnB, the homogeneous sector neutral
component of TFP:



































Figure 2.3: Comparison of appropriate human capital values with Hall and Jones (1999)’ estimates
for human capital per worker
By substituting (2.28) into ln (TFP ) = ln B + 1−α
α
ln Z we construct aggregate TFP. Figure
4.1 in Appendix indicate a strong linear relationship between our values for aggregate TFP
and Hall and Jones’ estimates. We find a correlation of 0.92 between the values predicted
by our model and Hall and Jones’ values.
To decompose this 24-fold difference in income per worker between the richest and the
poorest country we carry out a levels accounting exercise by decomposing the variance














methodology is based on the idea that the variance of y is divided up between the variance
of factors of accumulation and the variance of aggregate TFP:
var [ln (y)] = var [ln (factors)] + var [ln (TFP )] + 2cov [ln (factors), ln (TFP )]
Specifically, we calculate the contribution of each of these elements to the cross-country
income dispersion. Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), we allocate half of the
covariance term to TFP and the other half to factors of accumulation. Thus, the contribution
of aggregate TFP is given by:
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var [ln (TFP )] + cov [ln (factors), ln (TFP )]
var [ln (y)]
(2.29)
The covariance matrix shown in Table 2.2 presents the results of this decomposition exercise.
In accordance with the previous literature, aggregate TFP accounts for 62% in cross-country
income variation, while factors of accumulation (including human capital) explain only 39%.
We conclude that the direct effect of appropriate human capital on income differences is
weaker than its indirect effect through TFP. Further, we quantify this indirect effect to
see what is the impact of appropriate human capital on TFP differences and implicitly, on
income dispersion.
Table 2.2: Variance Decomposition of GDP/worker
Variable ln (y) ln (factors) ln (TFP )
ln (y) 0.632
ln (factors) 0.235 0.177
ln (TFP ) 0.387 0.071 0.321
Table A-2 in Appendix reports the values of TFP and its components relative to U.S.
values. After ranking countries with respect to aggregate TFP, we notice that the average
of the values of top five countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, U.S., Italy, and Canada) is about
6 times higher than the average TFP of the lowest five countries (Kenya, Ecuador, Peru,
Honduras, Jamaica). Ghana has an aggregate TFP equal to only 28% of aggregate TFP
in U.S.; moreover, Ghana’s inter-industry TFP is just 4% of U.S.’ inter-industry TFP. Not
surprinsingly, human capital intensity in U.S. is about 16 times higher than in Ghana.
The correlation between h and Z (not shown here) is 0.97 suggesting that inter-industry
productivity is driven by human capital.
By undertaking the second decomposition exercise we try to deepen these explanations.
Starting from equation (2.27), we decompose the variance of TFP in order to quantify the role
played by inter-industry TFP in explaining international TFP differences. The contribution
of inter-industry TFP is calculated based on the formula:













Table (2.3) summarizes our findings by reporting the covariance matrix. The variance of
Table 2.3: Variance Decomposition of TFP*
Variable ln (TFP ) ln (B) ln (Z
1−α
α )
ln (TFP ) 0.321
ln (B) 0.187 0.233
ln (Z
1−α
α ) 0.133 -0.004 0.180
* 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP is 2.2 (µ = 1). H consists of secondary completed education
and above.
inter-industry TFP represents 41% of the total variance in TFP and the covariance between
the homogeneous part of TFP and inter-industry TFP is very low. Thus, inter-industry
TFP has a major impact on total TFP. Since h directly determines Z (the correlation
between them is 0.97), we infer that appropriate human capital drives the differences in
inter-industry TFP, and indirectly the differences in aggregate TFP. Moreover, we find a
very weak correlation of −0.14 between skill intensity h and the residual B, the homogeneous
component of aggregate TFP, suggesting that (without being necessarily a proof) some other
factors, but not the appropriate human capital, determine the exogenous component of TFP.
This idea is reinforced by a weak correlation of −0.22 between inter-industry TFP and the
residual B.
For sensitivity purposes, we carry out the same exercise for µ = 0.5, which implies a lower
productivity gap between the most and the least complex industries within each country (the
ratio of inter-industry TFP between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile is 1.5). The
Table 2.4: Variance Decomposition of TFP for µ = 0.5 *
Variable ln (TFP ) ln (B) ln (Z
1−α
α )
ln (TFP ) 0.321
ln (B) 0.213 0.226
ln (Z
1−α
α ) 0.108 -0.001 0.121
* 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP is 1.5. H consists of secondary completed education and
above
results shown in Table 2.4 suggest that in this case inter-industry TFP, captured by Z
1−α
α ,
still accounts for a big fraction of 33% in total variation in TFP. Table 2.5 reports the results
for µ = 1.5 (i.e, the 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP is 3.3); in this case almost half of
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the variation of aggregate TFP (49%) originates from inter-industry TFP and implicitly
from appropriate human capital. Therefore, the higher the discrepancy between the most
Table 2.5: Variance Decomposition of TFP for µ = 1.5 *
Variable ln (TFP ) ln (B) ln (Z
1−α
α )
ln (TFP ) 0.321
ln (B) 0.161 0.256
ln (Z
1−α
α ) 0.160 -0.009 0.255
* The 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP is 3.3. H consists of secondary completed education and
above
productive and the least productive industries within a country, the more important is the
contribution of inter-industry TFP in the variance of aggregate TFP. Since this discrepancy
tends to be higher in less developed countries, the role of inter-industry TFP is even more
critical to them. In other words, there is more room for less skill intensive countries to
improve inter-industry TFP by increasing their stocks of human capital. Thus, policies that
stimulate skill intensity and inter-industry TFP would lower cross-country differences in
total factor productivity.
Overall, the results indicate a significant role for inter-industry TFP in the international
variation of TFP. Since human capital is driving the productivities of different industries
within a country, we expect human capital to be concentrated in the industries where tech-
nologies complement skills. We categorize industries in ten groups based on their sophis-
tication in order to calculate each group’s share in total GDP (see Appendix 1A). The
representation of industries within an economy is shaped by the existent human capital
intensity in the country: in a poor country, production is clustered in less skill intensive
industries, while in a rich country (human capital abundant), skill intensive industries are
better represented in GDP. Figure 2.4 captures exactly this trend: in Kenya’s case (Figure
2.4 Panel A), almost 60% of GDP can be attributed to the lowest 10% of varieties, 5% of
GDP is accounted by the next group and from here on, as we move up on the sophistication
scale, the shares of more complex varieties in GDP become smaller and smaller and almost
inexistent.
One can observe exactly the opposite pattern in U.S (Figure 2.4 Panel B), where the
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(A) Kenya (B) U.S.
Figure 2.4: Shares of industries in GDP (%).
shares of varieties in GDP are increasing in sophistication. The group of highest 10% of
varieties accounts for 14% of GDP, followed by the second highest 10% group that produces
12% of GDP, while the least intensive human capital industries that fall in the lowest 10%
group comprise only 0.02% of GDP.
Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, we carry out the same decomposition exercise of the
variance of TFP for a higher threshold of human capital. We measure human capital as
consisting of workers who have attained some higher education and above and we keep the
90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP at 2.2.
Table 2.6: Variance Decomposition of TFP for µ = 1.*
Variable ln (TFP ) ln (B) ln (Z
1−α
α )
ln (TFP ) 0.304
ln (B) 0.214 0.4
ln (Z
1−α
α ) 0.089 -0.185 0.274
* The 90/10 ratio of inter-industry TFP is 2.2. H consists of partial higher education and above.
Table 2.6 reports a decrease of the variance of inter-industry TFP falls to 29% of total
variance of TFP while the covariance term increases significantly. These results suggest that




Cross-country income differences have been pinned down to TFP differences, which are
captured by differences in technologies. Nonetheless, technologies differ not only across
countries, but also across industries within a country. Countries are not similarly equipped
to adopt technologies, therefore they are not equally efficient in using them. This hetero-
geneity arises from the relative role given to human capital by each country. A rich country,
abundant in human capital, favors more sophisticated industries that use human capital in-
tensively. However, the same industries are poorly represented in a less developed economy
that lacks the necessary skills to use complex technologies. Thus, each country’s human cap-
ital intensity is appropriate for an industry with a particular level of sophistication, where
technologies complement skills.
We capture this role of appropriate human capital in shaping each country’s map of in-
dustries. Specifically, we develop a theoretical endogenous model with a novel formulation of
the industry-level technology as a function of appropriate human capital. This new specifica-
tion allows us to decompose aggregate TFP into inter-industry TFP (the non-homogeneous
component of TFP driven by human capital) and an exogenous productivity residual. In
accordance with previous studies, aggregate TFP explains 62% of the variance of output
per worker. Moreover, after undertaking a variance decomposition exercise, we find that
inter-industry TFP accounts for 41% of the variation of aggregate TFP, suggesting that ap-
propriate human capital explains indirectly, through inter-industry TFP, a substantial part
of income differences.
Finally, appropriate human capital models the distribution of shares of industries into
GDP. The results of our levels accounting exercise show that in rich countries where tech-
nologies complement skills, a higher fraction of GDP is attributed to complex industries,




Multinationals Entry in a Model of
Appropriate Human Capital and
Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to analyze to what extent the world capital stock is
optimally allocated. The key question that we address is - do differences in returns to
capital investments impede the efficient allocation of the world capital stock ? In other
words, what is the impact of cross-country differences in returns to investments on capital
flows from rich to poor countries?
If capital flows freely from one country to another, then the global financial market should
be characterized by perfect capital mobility and the returns to investments or marginal
product of capital (MPK) are equalized across countries. On the other hand, significant
MPK differentials across countries would serve as evidence of an inefficient cross-country
distribution of capital stocks, implying that an optimal reallocation of the world supply of
capital could lead to welfare gains for less developed countries.
We use the technology-skill complementarity framework presented in Chapter 2 as a
tool to answer the key questions from above. Deviating from the closed economy structure,
we model the entry of foreign multinationals. The starting point is based on our previous
result that the appropriate human capital determines whether the market concentration
of domestic firms occurs in simple or complex industries. The fact that productivity is
assumed to be heterogeneous across industries and a function of human capital gives rise
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to multinationals entry in domestic markets, since in poor countries foreign firms have
a distinct advantage in sophisticated industries. Foreign and domestic firms engage in a
Bertrand competition over each variety. The model allows for an endogenous determination
of interest rates and yields the threshold industry starting from which foreign firms will edge
out domestic firms. This endogenous threshold depends directly on the country specific
human capital. The appropriate human capital generates endogenous shares of FDI in GDP
and our results indicate that multinationals’ entry does not crowd out domestic investments
and overall it leads to welfare gains from FDI.
The central idea of the model is that human capital abundance not only shapes each
country’s distribution of shares of industries in GDP but also endogenously determines the
amount of FDI. We analyze the implications of this model on credit market imperfections,
FDI and capital flows. Our results take into account the idea that FDI is a channel through
which less developed countries are able to import advanced technologies. In the absence
of foreign investments, a high fraction of a less developed country’s GDP is attributed to
low-tech industries, since less developed countries lack the necessary skills to use complex
technologies. Therefore multinationals’ entry allow poor countries to have access to complex
technologies used in hi-tech industries, which otherwise are very poorly represented on their
map of industries. Based on our calibration results, these gains from FDI translate into an
average increase of 38% in TFP. Moreover, using real world data we find that the calibrated
FDI inflows in poor contries account for more than 2/3 of world FDI.
The simulated model suggests that international credit markets are characterized by im-
perfect capital mobility that prevents capital from moving freely across countries. The aver-
age MPK in developing countries is almost twice as large as the average MPK in developed
countries. Consequently, the natural question that arises is: how would the distribution
of world capital look if capital was allowed to move freely across countries? Would FDI
boost the standard of living of emerging market economies if the world stock of capital was
optimally allocated? A switch from imperfect to perfect capital mobility such that MPK
would be equalized across countries would present new incentives for foreign firms to invest
in emerging markets in less developed countries. Therefore we impose an equalization on
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MPK, and we simulate the model again. Our results indicate that the shares of FDI in GDP
would increase on average by 10% in less developed countries. Based on our calculations
of counterfactual capital stocks and output, we conclude that developing economies would
clearly benefit from financial integration, since the average GDP per worker would increase
by 28%. On account of imperfect capital mobility, the world misses the opportunity to raise
the global output by 3%, representing the deadweight loss caused by the inefficient capital
allocation.
The previous literature pointed out the impact of international credit frictions as well
as the impact of differences in skill endowments and TFP on the world allocation of capital
stock. Lucas (1990) famously brought to attention the dilemma of neoclassical growth theory
that fails to find a rationale why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) use three different measures for MPK (the first one based on
the neoclassical model, another one that assumes a broader definition of capital that includes
land and natural resources, and the last one based on a multisector model) and find that
returns to capital investments are similar across countries. They show that the huge variation
in capital labor ratios is brought about by cross-country differences in human capital and
TFP and also by differences in the prices of capital and capital shares. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) estimate the welfare gains from financial integration using two versions of the
neoclassical model. Their findings suggest that although some countries gain significantly
when they switch from a closed economy setting to perfect capital mobility, on average
though, these benefits are not very large for poor countries. Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and
Kose (2003) show that the benefits of financial integration might manifest through indirect
channels: perfect capital mobility could raise the productivity of developing countries. In
the same line, Borenzstein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998) indicate that FDI may speed up
growth through technology diffusion rather than capital accumulation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the endogenous the-
oretical model where multinationals’ entry change the industrial structure of economies. In
section 3.3 we describe the calibration methodology, then we observe the current distribution
of world capital stock under imperfect capital mobility and the counterfactual distribution
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of world supply of capital under MPK equalization. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
We examine a world economy that consists of a subset of less developed countries and
another subset of developed countries. Each country is assigned to one of these two categories
based on its skill abundance (or human capital intensity). The structure of each economy
is defined by the model laid out in Chapter 2, where the country specific human capital
drives technologies, shapes each country’s industrial structure and leads to cross-country
differences in standard of living. Given this setting, we focus on the entry of foreign direct
investors in intermediate goods sectors.
In this section we determine the equilibrium capital stocks and we calculate endogenously
the amount of FDI of each country. Our model allows for an endogenous determination of
interest rates, which are used to calculate each country’s MPK.
3.2.1 Bertrand Competition
Each economy comprises two sectors: a final good sector and an intermediate good
sector, as described in Chapter 2. The intermediate good sector is shaped by a product
variety framework that allows for variation in the productivities of intermediate inputs.
Each intermediate good i can be produced with different technologies, thus with different
cost schedules. Therefore, foreign potential entrants with different technologies, invest in
domestic industries in order to take over the domestic market. As a consequence, the
domestic and foreign firm engage in a Bertrand competition and the outcome of this duopoly
is ultimately decided by technology differences. In other words, given industry i, the firm
that has a more advanced technology edges out successfully the other firm and takes over
the market.
Considering that both the domestic and foreign economy follow the same specification,
we simplify the notations by indexing variables with d and f , respectively.
Therefore, the domestic technology used for variety i is driven by the country specific
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human capital intensity, hd:








Similarly, the foreign technology used in industry i is determined by the foreign human
capital hf , but its productivity in the host country depends on the ease with which it can
be absorbed by the domestic economy. Therefore, the particular environment of the host
country shapes the productivity of the foreign firm in the host country. Consequently, the
foreign technology adopts the exogenous, sector neutral component of technology from the
domestic economy:








The foreign human capital hf is measured by the average of human capital intensities of all
countries havg.
Each industry i is characterized by its barriers to entry, i.e., the setup costs paid by
the two competitors, F di and F
f
i , that can be interpreted as license fees paid to acquire
technologies. The sum of all setup costs F di represents investments in domestic technologies,
while the sum of all entry costs F fi paid by MNC’s represents the FDI inflows in the host
country. Based on equation (2.13), the cost of entering the market is an increasing function
of technology. After the setup costs have been incurred, the firms compete against each
other and each firm’s strategy space is represented by prices. The duopolists set their prices
simultaneously without observing the other’s choice. In this sense, this is a one-shot game.
The firm with lower marginal cost eventually takes over the market and charges a price equal



























We first present the case of a less developed country. A less developed country is charac-
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terized by a relatively low level of human capital intensity. Thus, hd < hf , where hf = havg
represents the average of human capital intensities of all countries considered.
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Figure 3.1: Interaction between foreign and domestic technologies in a less developed country
Figure 3.1 depicts the domestic and foreign technologies simultaneously and their inter-
action as a result of Bertrand competition. We analyze the three possible scenarios a foreign
firm could be in after paying the setup costs to enter industry i:
1. Ad(i, hd) = Af,d(i, hf )
In this case industry productivities are equalized. This implies that variety i can
be produced with either foreign or domestic technology. Both firms have the same
marginal cost. Therefore, in equilibrium the firms share the market and both of them
charge the perfectly competitive price and earn zero profits:








This case allows us to determine the threshold industry i∗ for which domestic and

























) = 0. Since for a less developed country
hd < hf , it follows that the threshold industry i




The equation from above implies that the threshold industry is an increasing function
of domestic human capital hd and average human capital.
2. Ad(i, hd) > Af,d(i, hf )
Based on (3.3) and (3.4), if the foreign technology used in industry i is inferior to the
domestic one, then the domestic firm has the advantage of being the low cost firm and
it has three possible options:
• Suppose the domestic firm sets pd > MCf . This situation cannot lead to equi-
librium since the foreign firm would set a price between pd and MCf . Thus, the
profits of the domestic firm would drop to zero and the foreign firm would earn
positive profits.
• If the domestic firm sets pd < MCf , then this is a situation in which the domestic
firm “leaves money on the table” since it can do better by charging a slightly
higher price to increase its profits.
• The only possible equilibrium is when pd = MCf , which is the Nash equilibrium
of this game. The domestic firm becomes the sole producer of variety i and the
foreign producer is edged out of the market.









Next, we locate industry i in the range of industries from 0 to 1. Since in this case
Ad(i, hd) > Af,d(i, hf ), it follows that (ln hf − ln hd)(ln hd +ln hf − 2 ln i) > 0. In other
words, given that hd < hf , a foreign firm will not be able to produce in the domestic
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market for varieties i < i∗. Thus, in a less developed country any low tech industry
i ∈ (0,
√
hdhf ) is dominated by domestic producers. This result is consistent with
our previous findings from Chapter 2 that the industrial structure of a less developed
country is concentrated in low tech industries as a result of its relatively scarce human
capital, .
3. Af,d(i, hf ) > Ad(i, hd)
In this case, since the foreign technology is superior to the domestic technology, the
foreign firm is the low cost producer.
The only possible Nash equilibrium is when pf = MCd and thus, the foreign firm fully
controls industry i while the domestic firm is driven out of the market.









We determine the position of industry i in the range of industries. Af,d(i, hf ) >
Ad(i, hd) implies that (ln hd−ln hf )(ln hd+ln hf−2 ln i) > 0. Thus, for i > i
∗ the foreign
firm takes over industry i in a less developed country. In other words,i ∈ (
√
hdhf , 1),
i.e., foreign direct investments are made in hi-tech industries, at the end of the range
of technological sophistication.
Therefore, in a less developed country, the range of intermediate inputs i ∈ (0, 1) is
divided in two parts: domestic firms supply Xid units of low-tech intermediate goods over
(0, i∗), while foreign firms supply Xif units of hi-tech goods over (i
∗, 1).
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3.2.2 Production in a Less Developed Country
Final Good Sector
Under perfect competition, final good producers of country j combine capital KY , domesti-












, 0 < α < 1 (3.7)
The final good is considered the numeraire good. The maximization problem of final
good producers is given by:









− (rj + d)KYj
where rj is the country specific interest rate and d represents the depreciation rate of capital,
d < 1. From here on, for the simplicity of the exposure, we omit the country index j unless
otherwise noted.






= 0) yield the conditional demands for inputs
Xid and Xif :



















Both domestic and foreign intermediate producers combine their technologies with domestic
unskilled and skilled labor. Therefore they follow the same specification:









• Domestic intermediate goods producers
Domestic firms supply Xid over the range (0, i
∗) and charge a price pd = MCf . They
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maximize profits by choosing the optimum amount of inputs Lid and Hid, and the
optimum level of output Xid.
πd = pdXid − C(wLd, wHd, Xid)






= 0) yield the nominal wages wLd and

















































Xid − MCd = 0
The conditional demand for Xid from (3.9) is used in the equation from above to
calculate profits per unit:




= α(1 − α)K1−αY X
α−1
id
Thus, the profits earned by the domestic duopolist are:






= (1 − α)α
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• Foreign intermediate goods producers
Foreign firms supply Xif over the range (i
∗, 1) and charge a price pf = MCd. Their
profits are maximized with respect to inputs Lif and Hif , and output Xif .
πf = pfXif − C(wLf , wHf , Xif )






= 0) yield the nominal wages wLf and
wHf and the explicit demand for Xif :
wLf = δαK
1−α





wHd = (1 − δ)αK
1−α



























Xif − MCf = 0
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Next we calculate profits per unit by inserting the conditional demand for Xif from
(3.10) into the first order condition from above:




= α(1 − α)K1−αY X
α−1
if
Therefore the foreign profits are given by:













































Foreign direct investments in appropriate technologies consist of the sum of setup costs

























3.2.3 General Equilibrium in a Less Developed Country
The decentralized equilibrium of the model is described by the following conditions:
1. Y = C + I
2. Capital allocation: K = KY + KX + FDI














The capital allocation condition suggests that total capital stock K consists of capital
investments in final good sector, KY , domestic capital investments in technologies, KX , and
FDI in technologies in the intermediate good sector. Capital depreciates at rate d < 1, thus
Kt+1 − Kt(1 + d) = It = Yt − Ct. The labor market equilibrium condition implies that the
unskilled and skilled labor employed by domestic and foreign firms in all industries i ∈ (0, 1)
add up to total labor supply.
The industry specific demands for unskilled and skilled labor (Li and Hi) are calculated





























































In equilibrium nominal wages are equalized, therefore wLd = wLf = wL and wHd =
wHf = wH . Next, we express the equilibrium nominal wages as functions of technologies
































Next, we derive the equilibrium expressions for KX and FDI. In this sense, we substitute
the equilibrium nominal wages from (3.25) and (3.26) into the expressions of KX and FDI
















































We substitute the equilibrium nominal wages given by (3.25) and (3.26) into the explicit
demand for intermediates Xid and Xif given by (3.13) and (3.18) in order to determine the
aggregate income. Thus, in equilibrium Y is given by:



























3.2.4 The Case of a Developed Country
A developed economy is characterized by a relatively high human capital intensity, hd > hf .
Following a reasoning similar to the case of a less developed country, we find that in a
developed economy, the outcome of Bertrand competition splits the spectrum of industries
in an opposite way than in a less developed economy: foreign firms supply Xif units of low
tech goods when i ∈ (0, i∗), while domestic producers supply Xid units of hi-tech goods over
the range (i∗, 1).
Consequently, the firm that dominates technologically the other sets its price equal to

















We present the equilibrium results for a developed economy. The derivation of these
results can be found in the Appendix. We calculate the investments in domestic technologies
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KX by summing up the setup costs F
d
i corresponding to industries i ∈ (i
∗, 1). In equilibrium
























Similarly, foreign direct investments in low tech industries are determined by summing up
the entry costs F fi paid by foreign firms in industries i ∈ (0, i
∗). The equilibrium expression
























In equilibrium, the aggregate income is:




























One channel through which FDI raises the income level of a country is TFP. By allowing
inflows of FDI in their complex industries, developing countries gain access to those advanced
technologies that make foreign firms more productive. Thus, as a result of multinationals’
presence, developing countries enjoy an increase in their productivity, which ultimately is
reflected on income levels. In order to measure the TFP of a less developed country, we










Bd [W1 + Z2]
1



























































The previous equation points out the expression for TFP for a less developed country:
TFP = Bd [W1 + Z2]
1
α [Z1 + W2]−1 (3.34)
We compare the our model’s prediction on TFP with the standard results of Hall and Jones
(1999). We use the same data for a cross-section of 51 countries for the year 2000 as in
Chapter 2. We approximate numerically the definite integrals under Z1, Z2, W1, and
W2 by using the quadratic interpolation method. Then, we back out Bd, the exogenous
component of TFP, from (3.33) and substitute it back in (3.34) in order to obtain the
estimates for aggregate TFP. Figure 3.2 suggests a strong linear relationship between our






















Figure 3.2: Comparison of TFP values with Hall and Jones (1999)’ estimates
estimates for TFP and Hall and Jones’ values. We find a correlation of 0.83 between the
values predicted by our model and Hall and Jones’ values.
Based on our results from Chapter 2, in a closed less developed economy, a high fraction
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of its GDP is concentrated in low tech industries, where the technologies complemented the
country’s low skills. The premise of this chapter is that FDI is a channel through which a
less developed country has access to better technologies brought by foreign producers.


































Figure 3.3: Comparison of TFP estimates in closed vs. open economy
In other words, multinationals’ entry gives less developed countries the opportunity to
increase their TFP by taking advantage of foreign firms’ higher productivities in complex
industries. Therefore, we compare the estimates for TFP with the previous estimates pre-
sented in Chapter 2, corresponding to the case of a closed economy. Figure 3.3 plots the the
previous estimates for TFP against the current ones. Indeed, as a result of multinationals’
entry, TFP estimates increase on average by 38% .
3.3.1 Marginal Product of Capital Differentials
The objective of our exercise is to analyze the effect of foreign direct investments on domestic
output and to observe the current world allocation of capital stocks across countries. In this
sense, we determine endogenously the equilibrium interest rates implied by our theoretical
model. In order to do so, we start from the capital allocation condition and from MPK









After plugging in the estimates for GDP given by (3.36), we get a quadratic equation in r
that gives us the estimates for MPK = r + d (the depreciation rate of capital is d = 0.03).



























Figure 3.4: MPK estimates
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics relative to U.S. values
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
k 0.393 0.384 0.018 1.713
MPK 1.391 0.676 0.527 3.253
TFP 0.497 0.257 0.124 1.055
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for k, MPK and TFP calculated in relative
to U.S. values. The values reflect enormous variation across countries in capital per worker
and rates of return to capital investments. Capital per worker in Kenya, the country with
the lowest GDP per worker from the sample, is only 2.21% of capital per worker in U.S.
while MPK in the richest country (Singapore) is 3.64 times lower than in the least developed
country.
Our estimates suggest that there are large MPK differentials across countries. Figure
3.4 indicates a clearly negative relationship between MPK and GDP per worker. The aver-
45
age MPK in less developed countries sample is 1.83 times higher than the average MPK in
developed countries. As a result of these significant differences in rates of return to invest-
ments, the world financial market is characterized by imperfect capital mobility. Thus the
equilibrium world output is not efficiently allocated across countries. Instead, developing
economies might have a better chance to increase their GDP if the world capital stock would
be optimally distributed, which would result in higher capital flows from low to high interest
rates countries.
Next we calculate each country’s allocation of total capital stock across domestic invest-
ments (KY and KX) and foreign capital inflows (FDI).
Aggregate income, domestic investments, and FDI can be rewritten as:
Y = K1−αY L









LδH(1−δ)Bd [W1 + Z2]
1




(1 − α)αK1−αY L





(1 − α)αK1−αY L
αδHα(1−δ)Bαd Z2 [Z1 + W2]
−α (3.39)
Table 3.4 reports the estimates for domestic and foreign capital per worker (KY , KX , and
FDI) for all 51 countries in the sample. FDI inflows in less developed countries represent
69% of world FDI. Out of the set of less developed countries, China is the biggest recipient
of FDI: foreign investments in Chinese markets account for 27% of world FDI flows. In per
worker terms, however, the situation is different: Portugal has the highest FDI per worker,
while China’s FDI per worker represents only 21% of Portugal’s. The average FDI per
worker in less developed countries sample represents 8.1% of capital per worker.
Using the equilibrium expressions for FDI and GDP given by (3.39) and (3.36), we

















Table 3.3 reports the estimates for MPK, the shares of FDI in GDP, and the shares of FDI
in K for all 51 countries from our sample. The shares of FDI in GFP are consistently higher
in less developed countries than in rich countries. In the former sample, FDI accounts on
average for 14.44 % of GDP, while only 3.48% in the latter sample. Thus the average share
of FDI in GDP is 4.14 times higher in less developed countries than in developed countries.
Next, we rank countries with respect to MPK’s. We notice that the average FDI per
worker in the top five countries with highest MPK’s (Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, Thai-
land, and South Korea) is 3.61 larger than in the countries with lowest five values for MPK
(Ghana, Guatemala, Pakistan, El Salvador, and Kenya). For instance, Ghana’s FDI per
worker represents only 13% of U.S.’ value for FDI per worker. One possible explanation for
this result relies on our previous outcome that the the industrial structure of an economy
and its TFP are shaped by the appropriate human capital. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
human capital intensity in Ghana in 16 times lower than in U.S..






















Share of FDI in GDP
fitted values
Figure 3.5: Share of FDI in GDP vs. human capital intensity
However, Figure 3.5 indicates a negative linear relationship between human capital in-
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tensity and the share of FDI in GDP (the correlation between them, not shown here, is
-0.70).
Therefore, even though foreign investments are relatively low in very poor countries,
multinationals raise significantly these countries’ income levels, making a notable difference
in their standard of living.
3.3.2 Perfect Capital Mobility
The MPK differentials previously shown support the view that financial markets are not
integrated and consequently, the distribution of world capital stock is not efficient. Therefore
we carry out the following experiment: we observe how the efficient world allocation of capital
would look under perfect capital mobility, or in other words if capital would be allowed to
move freely across countries. The premise of this reallocation of world supply of capital is
based on perfect capital mobility, i.e., MPK equalization. We are interested in finding out
how the reallocation of world capital stock would affect income levels, FDI inflows and the
ranking of countries.
In order to proceed with this exercise, we calculate the world interest rate rw that would
ensure perfect capital mobility. First, we construct the ratio
KYi
Ki
for country i by using the






1 + ri + α(ri + d)
Under MPK equalization, the interest rate r is uniform across countries, i.e.,ri = rw. By
summing up for all countries, we calculate the world supply of capital, Kw, as a function of




















We substitute this expression into the equation for worls supply of capital stock. Therefore,
the world interest rate is given by:
1 + rw












We solve numerically the nonlinear equation from above and we find that the world interest
rate is rw = 0.14. This implies that the average of actual interest rates is 1.37 times higher
than rw. Once we determined rw, the next step is to back out the counterfactual output and
capital when interest rates are equalized. We substitute in the capital allocation condition
the equilibrium expressions for KY , KX , and FDI given by (3.37), (3.38), and (3.39). Thus,
















Next, we plug in Kci from above into (3.3.2) to determine the domestic investments in final
good sector KYci .
KYci = Kci
1 + rw
1 + rw + α(rw + d)





















diZ2i [Z1i + W2i]
−α
Table 3.5 reports the counterfactual values for domestic capital and FDI in per worker
terms when the world supply of capital is optimally allocated. We observe a huge increase
of 120% in capital stock in the average less developed country. The average developed
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country experiences a 9% decrease in its capital stock due to the reallocation of worls capital
stock. The major recipients of FDI would be still the less developed countries, where under
MPK equalization, FDI would increase on average by 45%. The most remarkable change
is observed in Ghana’s case, where FDI rises by 145%. In the developed countries sample,
FDI decreases on average by 6% as a result of capital reallocation.
As a consequence of specialization in industries where domestic technologies comple-
ment human capital, domestic investments in technologies follow the same pattern as FDI,
increasing by 45% in the average less developed country and decreasing by 6% in the aver-
age rich country. This implies that overall foreign investments do not crowd out domestic
investments.
Table 3.2: Average changes under perfect capital mobility
Sample KY KX FDI K y
Less developed countries +135% +45% +45% 120% 28%
Developed countries -9% -6% -6% -9% -5%
Table 3.2 summarizes these findings by presenting the average changes in equilibrium
capital and output as a result of perfect capital mobility in less developed and developed
countries.
Figure 4.4 plots the optimal allocation of capital per worker and GDP per worker against
the actual allocation. We find a strong positive correlation between the actual and counter-
factual estimates for GDP per worker is 0.97, while in the case of capital per worker, this
correlation is 0.86.
The only outliers in the sample whose GDP per worker would fall as a results of MPK
equalization are Thailand, Singapore, Switzerland, Japan and South Korea.
As a result of MPK equalization, less developed countries experience a huge increase in
GDP per worker; the average less developed country would increase its output per worker by
28% as a result of free movement of capital, while rich countries would lose 5% of their GDP
per worker after MPK equalization. At the global level, the world misses the opportunity
to increase the world output by 3% because of the existence of MPK differentials.
Table 3.6 reports the percentage changes in GDP per worker and capital per worker
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(A) Capital per worker (B) Output per worker
Figure 3.6: Counterfactual capital and output per worker under perfect capital mobility


















































































Figure 3.7: Shares of FDI in GDP and K under imperfect and perfect capital mobility
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as financial markets switch from imperfect to perfect capital mobility. The table reports
the new shares of FDI in counterfactual GDP’s. Figure 3.7 plots the distribution of FDI
shares under MPK equalizations against the distribution of these shares in imperfect capital
mobility. We notice a clear split: the shares of FDI in GDP (as well as the shares of FDI in
K) are very high and variable in the poor countries, and significantly lower and constant in
rich countries. Overall, the shares of FDI in GDP increase by 10% in poor countries and fall
by 1% in rich countries when capital moves freely across countries. On the other hand, the
shares of FDI in K fall by 22% in less deveoped countries and increase by 12% in developed
countries.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the current allocation world of capital stock and the effect of foreign
direct investments on domestic output. Our first finding is that less developed countries
increase significantly their total factor productivity and thus, their standard of living by
allowing multinationals to invest in their most advanced industries. The premise of this
chapter is based on the concept that FDI is a channel through which less developed countries
gain access to complex technologies. Therefore, TFP increases as foreign investments flow
in industries where multinationals have a technological advantage. Our estimates for TFP
are 38% higher in the open economy case than in the closed economy case. These results
suggest that FDI may boost the standard of living of developing countries primarily through
technology diffusion.
The theoretical model that we use builds on the technology-skill complementarity frame-
work developed in Chapter 2 in which foreign firms engage in a Bertrand competition with
domestic firms over each industry. The FDI threshold industry starting from which multina-
tionals overthrow the domestic producers is an increasing function of host country’s appro-
priate human capital. Our focus is to observe the current allocation of world capital stock
across countries by deriving endogenously the interest rates. The results indicate that there
are significant MPK differences across countries that prevent a free movement of capital.
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Therefore, financial markets are characterized by imperfect capital mobility that leads to an
inefficient allocation of world supply of capital stock. In this setting, FDI inflows in poor
countries represent 69% of world FDI. The shares of FDI in GDP are more than four times
higher in less developed countries than in developed countries.
The second finding is based on a hypothetical experiment of reallocating the world capital
stock such that it would be optimally distributed across countries and MPK would be
equalized. We determine the world interest rate and the counterfactual output and capital
stock of each country. As a result of MPK equalization, the capital stock would dramatically
increase by 120% in the average less developed country and would fall by 9% in the average
developed country. Also, the deadweight loss of failing to equalize interest rates represents
3% of the actual global output.
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Table 3.3: Imperfect capital mobility. Estimates for MPK= marginal product of capital,
shares of FDI in GDP, and shares of FDI in K.




Argentina ARG 0.20 2.88 1.50
Australia AUS 0.14 3.78 1.47
Bolivia BOL 0.36 14.10 12.66
Botswana BWA 0.29 13.42 9.85
Brazil BRA 0.19 15.75 7.92
Canada CAN 0.14 4.31 1.62
Chile CHL 0.24 15.69 9.85
China CHN 0.26 15.07 9.99
Colombia COL 0.31 14.43 11.46
Costa Rica CRI 0.34 14.44 12.42
Cyprus CYP 0.24 2.95 1.84
Dominican Republic DOM 0.43 13.44 14.14
Ecuador ECU 0.23 15.87 9.36
El Salvador SLV 0.47 12.57 14.39
France FRA 0.14 3.19 1.20
Germany GER 0.14 3.43 1.26
Ghana GHA 0.57 10.24 13.83
Greece GRC 0.13 3.60 1.32
Guatemala GTM 0.53 11.37 14.42
Honduras HND 0.23 14.81 9.06
Hong Kong HKG 0.16 3.63 1.56
Hungary HUN 0.17 16.72 7.46
India IND 0.38 13.18 12.53
Indonesia IDN 0.26 14.33 9.54
Israel ISR 0.17 3.48 1.60
Italy ITA 0.14 3.07 1.13
Jamaica JAM 0.18 14.48 7.06
Japan JPN 0.09 3.47 0.90
Kenya KEN 0.42 10.80 11.16
Malaysia MYS 0.19 16.00 8.12
Mexico MEX 0.18 16.48 7.80
Netherlands NLD 0.15 3.22 1.33
Nicaragua NIC 0.41 12.98 13.01
Pakistan PAK 0.48 12.76 14.91
Panama PAN 0.21 3.22 1.75
Paraguay PRY 0.31 14.60 11.44
Peru PER 0.16 3.21 1.35
Philippines PHL 0.28 3.17 2.28
Portugal PRT 0.16 16.67 7.36
South Korea KOR 0.12 4.29 1.43
Singapore SGP 0.12 17.08 5.42
Sri Lanka LKA 0.38 13.58 12.89
Sweden SWE 0.15 4.21 1.73
Switzerland CHE 0.11 3.66 1.12
Taiwan TWN 0.22 3.24 1.89
Thailand THA 0.12 17.03 5.50
Tunisia TUN 0.29 14.62 10.94
UK GBR 0.18 3.03 1.48
Uruguay URY 0.30 14.82 11.46
USA USA 0.18 4.11 1.93
Venezuela VEN 0.21 16.10 8.76
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Table 3.4: Imperfect capital mobility. Estimates for kY = domestic investments in final
good sector per worker; kX= domestic investments in appropriate technologies per worker; fdi=
foreign direct investments in appropriate technologies per worker; k= capital per worker.
Country Country code kY kX fdi k
Argentina ARG 27643 2613 460 30717
Australia AUS 77104 5315 1227 83646
Bolivia BOL 4488 132 670 5289
Botswana BWA 13489 504 1529 15522
Brazil BRA 18547 373 1628 20547
Canada CAN 82103 5324 1438 88865
Chile CHL 22292 448 2484 25224
China CHN 6982 170 794 7946
Colombia COL 9942 280 1323 11544
Costa Rica CRI 12081 323 1759 14162
Cyprus CYP 37644 4139 781 42564
Dominican Republic DOM 7544 247 1283 9073
Ecuador ECU 10043 193 1057 11293
El Salvador SLV 5297 220 928 6444
France FRA 75997 5287 988 82272
Germany GER 74861 5031 1022 80914
Ghana GHA 1432 104 246 1782
Greece GRC 43068 2855 615 46538
Guatemala GTM 4532 253 806 5591
Honduras HND 5317 140 544 6001
Hong Kong HKG 82551 6310 1410 90271
Hungary HUN 29204 433 2388 32025
India IND 3456 132 514 4103
Indonesia IDN 7580 227 823 8630
Israel ISR 58623 4800 1034 64457
Italy ITA 66553 4570 813 71937
Jamaica JAM 12221 328 953 13502
Japan JPN 104120 5013 987 110120
Kenya KEN 1787 118 239 2144
Malaysia MYS 30630 573 2756 33959
Mexico MEX 22812 366 1960 25138
Netherlands NLD 71270 5388 1035 77692
Nicaragua NIC 4739 188 737 5664
Pakistan PAK 2666 101 485 3252
Panama PAN 18953 1819 370 21141
Paraguay PRY 8845 237 1173 10255
Peru PER 14105 1082 208 15395
Philippines PHL 7797 949 204 8950
Portugal PRT 45332 682 3657 49672
South Korea KOR 55820 3254 859 59932
Singapore SGP 154730 1890 8975 165590
Sri Lanka LKA 4894 166 749 5808
Sweden SWE 69520 4923 1313 75755
Switzerland CHE 103380 5753 1233 110370
Taiwan TWN 36463 3724 774 40961
Thailand THA 25645 319 1511 27476
Tunisia TUN 11780 319 1486 13585
UK GBR 56586 5004 924 62514
Uruguay URY 16049 400 2130 18579
USA USA 87770 7023 1865 96657
Venezuela VEN 17820 322 1741 19883
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Table 3.5: Perfect capital mobility. Estimates for kY = domestic investments in final good
sector per worker; kX= domestic investments in appropriate technologies per worker; fdi= foreign
direct investments in appropriate technologies per worker; k= capital per worker.
Country Country code kY kX fdi k
Argentina ARG 32098 2793 492 35384
Australia AUS 55373 4605 1063 61041
Bolivia BOL 13028 219 1114 14362
Botswana BWA 27828 707 2142 30676
Brazil BRA 20388 389 1698 22475
Canada CAN 56003 4513 1219 61735
Chile CHL 35366 553 3067 38986
China CHN 12144 219 1024 13386
Colombia COL 23412 418 1978 25808
Costa Rica CRI 32581 517 2817 35915
Cyprus CYP 59003 5081 959 65043
Dominican Republic DOM 28710 474 2464 31648
Ecuador ECU 14369 227 1244 15839
El Salvador SLV 23330 457 1931 25717
France FRA 52052 4489 839 57379
Germany GER 49456 4207 855 54518
Ghana GHA 8388 255 604 9247
Greece GRC 28278 2382 513 31173
Guatemala GTM 23814 583 1855 26251
Honduras HND 8084 170 658 8912
Hong Kong HKG 70293 5881 1314 77488
Hungary HUN 26330 414 2281 29025
India IND 11053 232 899 12184
Indonesia IDN 13273 293 1065 14631
Israel ISR 55747 4695 1011 61453
Italy ITA 44005 3824 681 48509
Jamaica JAM 12753 334 971 14058
Japan JPN 38793 3317 653 42764
Kenya KEN 6591 223 452 7265
Malaysia MYS 34129 601 2892 37623
Mexico MEX 22656 365 1954 24975
Netherlands NLD 56865 4882 938 62685
Nicaragua NIC 16616 346 1355 18317
Pakistan PAK 12160 215 1029 13405
Panama PAN 23583 2006 408 25997
Paraguay PRY 20378 350 1736 22464
Peru PER 11557 992 191 12740
Philippines PHL 15494 1306 280 17080
Portugal PRT 40235 648 3471 44353
South Korea KOR 31436 2546 672 34654
Singapore SGP 80312 1430 6790 88533
Sri Lanka LKA 15628 290 1310 17227
Sweden SWE 55009 4445 1185 60640
Switzerland CHE 50275 4238 908 55421
Taiwan TWN 51268 4345 903 56516
Thailand THA 13685 244 1156 15086
Tunisia TUN 25091 454 2114 27659
UK GBR 59003 5098 941 65043
Uruguay URY 36171 586 3117 39874
USA USA 86085 6963 1849 94897
Venezuela VEN 22279 356 1925 24560
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Table 3.6: Perfect capital mobility. Estimates for: %∆y =change in GDP per worker
after MPK equalization; %∆k =% change in capital per worker after MPK equalization ; yf
=counterfactual GDP per worker;
FDIf
Yf
=share of FDI in GDP under MPK equalization;
FDIf
Kf
=share of FDI in K under MPK equalization.





Argentina ARG 0.05 0.15 16808 2.93 1.39
Australia AUS -0.11 -0.27 28996 3.67 1.74
Bolivia BOL 0.44 1.72 6822 16.33 7.76
Botswana BWA 0.28 0.98 14572 14.70 6.98
Brazil BRA 0.03 0.09 10676 15.91 7.56
Canada CAN -0.12 -0.31 29326 4.16 1.97
Chile CHL 0.17 0.55 18519 16.56 7.87
China CHN 0.21 0.68 6359 16.10 7.65
Colombia COL 0.34 1.24 12260 16.13 7.66
Costa Rica CRI 0.40 1.54 17061 16.51 7.84
Cyprus CYP 0.17 0.53 30897 3.10 1.47
Dominican Republic DOM 0.58 2.49 15034 16.39 7.79
Ecuador ECU 0.13 0.40 7524 16.53 7.85
El Salvador SLV 0.66 2.99 12217 15.81 7.51
France FRA -0.12 -0.30 27257 3.08 1.46
Germany GER -0.13 -0.33 25898 3.30 1.57
Ghana GHA 0.82 4.19 4393 13.75 6.53
Greece GRC -0.13 -0.33 14808 3.46 1.64
Guatemala GTM 0.76 3.69 12470 14.87 7.06
Honduras HND 0.15 0.49 4233 15.54 7.38
Hong Kong HKG -0.05 -0.14 36809 3.57 1.70
Hungary HUN -0.03 -0.09 13788 16.55 7.86
India IND 0.48 1.97 5788 15.54 7.38
Indonesia IDN 0.21 0.70 6950 15.33 7.28
Israel ISR -0.02 -0.05 29192 3.46 1.65
Italy ITA -0.13 -0.33 23043 2.95 1.40
Jamaica JAM 0.01 0.04 6678 14.54 6.91
Japan JPN -0.29 -0.61 20314 3.22 1.53
Kenya KEN 0.56 2.39 3451 13.09 6.22
Malaysia MYS 0.04 0.11 17872 16.18 7.69
Mexico MEX 0.00 -0.01 11864 16.47 7.82
Netherlands NLD -0.07 -0.19 29777 3.15 1.50
Nicaragua NIC 0.53 2.23 8701 15.57 7.40
Pakistan PAK 0.68 3.12 6368 16.16 7.68
Panama PAN 0.08 0.23 12349 3.30 1.57
Paraguay PRY 0.33 1.19 10671 16.26 7.73
Peru PER -0.07 -0.17 6052 3.15 1.50
Philippines PHL 0.26 0.91 8114 3.46 1.64
Portugal PRT -0.04 -0.11 21069 16.47 7.83
South Korea KOR -0.18 -0.42 16462 4.08 1.94
Singapore SGP -0.20 -0.47 42056 16.15 7.67
Sri Lanka LKA 0.48 1.97 8184 16.01 7.60
Sweden SWE -0.08 -0.20 28806 4.11 1.95
Switzerland CHE -0.22 -0.50 26327 3.45 1.64
Taiwan TWN 0.12 0.38 26847 3.36 1.60
Thailand THA -0.19 -0.45 7166 16.14 7.67
Tunisia TUN 0.29 1.04 13139 16.09 7.64
UK GBR 0.01 0.04 30897 3.05 1.45
Uruguay URY 0.32 1.15 18941 16.46 7.82
USA USA -0.01 -0.02 45079 4.10 1.95
Venezuela VEN 0.08 0.24 11667 16.50 7.84
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Chapter 4
Absorptive Capacities and the Impact
of FDI on Economic Growth
4.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades the world has experienced an unprecedented upsurge of FDI
flows. World FDI more than tripled since 1990 and currently, more than 50% of the pri-
vate capital flows of developing countries are represented by foreign investments. These
stylized facts suggest that FDI is now very much a global affair and its increasing impor-
tance as a catalyst that boosts the growth of developing countries is just another feature of
globalization.
However, the experience has shown that some countries experienced higher growth rates
as a result of increased FDI, while others did not. Previous studies analyzed the required
conditions for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. One of the proposed explanations in
the literature consists of the idea that positive spillovers from FDI depend on the absorptive
capacity of a country, i.e., on the existence of various local conditions favorable to economic
growth. This explanation is based on the concept that FDI is a channel through which
developing countries gain access to advanced technologies and increase their TFP. But in
order to absorb these advanced technologies, host economies need to meet certain conditions
that define the absorptive capacity of a country.
This chapter analyzes the optimal mix of such conditions that allows FDI to speed
up growth. We evaluate different combinations of measures for absorptive capacity that
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could generate the most favorable economic environment for positive spillovers from FDI.
Therefore, we carry out a unified study of absorptive capacities by analyzing the simultaneous
interactions of FDI with other growth determinants and their effect on economic growth. The
set of these growth determinants consists of various measures for absorptive capacity that
were individually and separately taken into account by the previous literature (development
of financial markets, level of human capital, trade openness, natural resource abundance).
The contribution of this chapter lies in our empirical approach. We construct linear
interaction terms between FDI and each proxy for absorptive capacity and then we evaluate
the robustness of these interaction terms relative to each other. Thus we analyze all possible
combinations of favorable conditions that are the most beneficial for FDI and their outcome
on the impact of FDI on growth. We find that countries with well developed financial
markets that have either low agricultural exports or low oil exports constitute the optimum
setting for welfare gains from FDI to exist. Our results indicate that positive spillovers from
FDI may coexist with low human capital only if the financial markets of the host country are
well developed. Also, the results suggest that oil abundant countries that trade intensively
have lower growth rates as a result of FDI.
As an exercise, we then employ the empirical approach of the previous literature by
regressing FDI and individual interaction terms on growth rates. We find that gains from
FDI exist only when FDI interacts with well developed financial markets and relatively high
levels of human capital that induce growth. We then analyze the extent to which these
requirements differ across various regions of the world.
Previous studies have shown that even though the first and immediate benefit from FDI
comes from the direct capital financing carried out by foreign investors, nevertheless the
contribution of FDI to growth consists mainly of diffusion of technologies from rich to poor
countries. As Romer (1990) first pointed out, cross-country differences in GDP per worker
are accounted for by the huge gaps of ideas across counties (i.e., gaps between technologies
and productivities with which rival inputs are used or TFP). Since multinational corporations
(MNC) have undertaken a major part of world’s R&D, their presence in developing countries
eases the transfer of technologies. This process can take the form of imitation/adoption of
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technologies, formation of forward and backward linkages between industries, and a higher
productivity of using the existing technologies.
The common intuition is that FDI should have only positive effects on the development of
host economies by giving rise to technology diffusion, productivity gains, access to emerging
markets, transfer of business know-how, and employee training. As a consequence, over the
last decade developing countries eased the restrictions on FDI by offering tax incentives and
subsidies in order to attract foreign capital. However, the empirical evidence has shown that
the causality between FDI and growth is ambiguous, in the sense that it is still not clear
whether FDI determines growth or vice versa. More often than not studies based on micro
level data did not find significant positive effects of FDI on growth, whereas the consensus
among macroeconomic studies (that use FDI flows for cross sections of countries) is that FDI
may speed up growth conditional on the absorptive capacity of the host country. In other
words, these studies suggest that the extent to which foreign technologies are internalized
by developing countries is dependent on the absorptive capacity.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next subsection presents the findings
of the previous literature; Section 4.2 presents the empirical methodology and the results.
Section 4.3 concludes.
4.1.1 Related Literature
A recurring idea in the previous literature is the condition for a developing country to have
reached a certain threshold of development for positive spillovers from FDI to exist. The
magnitude of spillovers or, in other words, the impact of FDI on economic growth varies
with the absorptive capacity of the host economy. Previous studies have shown that the
absorptive capacity depends on a minimum threshold level of human capital, well developed
financial markets, trade openness, levels of income, and technological gap.
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) have shown that is takes an educated labor force
to spread the benefits of new technologies across all industries. Foreign investments are able
to speed up growth only when there is a minimum threshold level of human capital in the
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host economy. Their findings indicate that the gains from FDI come through technology
diffusion rather than through capital accumulation.
Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) point out that economies with well
developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI. The level of development of financial
market is a deciding factor whether MNC’s operate isolated in enclaves or they become
catalysts for technology transfers. Blomstrom, Lypsey, and Zejan (1994) show that FDI has
a significant impact on growth and positive spillovers from FDI depend on the income level
of the host economy, but not on education. According to Balusubramayam, Salisu, and
Sapsford (1999), trade openness is another component of a country’s absorptive capacity
that increases the contribution of FDI to economic growth.
Carkovic and Levine (2002) show that the benefits from FDI are conditional on other
growth determinants, while the exogenous component of FDI does not have a robust positive
effect on growth. Therefore they show that FDI per se does not have a direct influence on
growth.
A vast part of the literature addressed the issue of the relationship between FDI spillovers
and absorptive capacities. According to the first strand of the literature, this relationship is
a positive and linear one. The idea dates back to the “relative backwardness” hypothesis of
Findlay (1978) that states that the rate of technological progress of a relatively backward
country is an increasing function of the technological gap. Therefore the absorptive capacity
is measured as the size of the technological gap and technology diffusion from FDI takes
place through a “contagion effect”. As a result, FDI increases the rate of technological
progress in the host country. The other view considers a quadratic relationship between
FDI and absorptive capacity. Girma (2005) uses firm level data from UK and finds that
the effect of FDI on TFP growth depends on the absorptive capacity that is defined as the
distance of a firm from the technological leader in the industry. He shows that there is a
non-linear relationship between absorptive capacities and spillovers from FDI. In Girma and
Gorg (2005), FDI is interacted with absorptive capacity. They show that there is a U-shaped
relationship between this interaction term and TFP growth suggesting that improvements




Our dataset consists of a cross-section of 69 countries and comprises measures for FDI and
for other determinants of economic growth between 1975 and 2000. Several sources were
used to construct the final data. We begin with a short description of the measures used in
our analysis.
Data for growth rates, real GDP per capita, investment rates, and trade are extracted
from Penn World Tables 6.1. The average of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita
represents the dependent variable in our regression analysis. The initial GDP enters as the
log of real PPP GDP per capita, while the investment rate is measured as the log of average
of investment shares in real GDP per capita. Openness to trade is calculated as the log of
total trade as a percentage of current GDP i.e., log ( X+M
PPP GDP
), where X and M denotes
exports and imports in real prices.
Data for FDI are obtained from World Development Indicators. FDI represents the sum
of equity capital, reinvestments and other types of capital and it is measured as average of
net inflows of foreign investment as percentage of GDP.
As a financial market indicator we use the log of private credit (credit by deposit money
banks to GDP) provided by Easterly (2001). Data for educational attainment is provided
by Barro and Lee (2001) that reports the average years of secondary schooling in total
population over the age of 25.
Data for other explanatory variables, such as agriculture and oil exports are obtained
from World Development Indicators. We use the log of average of agricultural raw materials
exports in total merchandise exports and the log of average fuel exports in total merchandise
exports in current US$ as controls for natural resources abundance.
Finally, we add fixed factors in our analysis in order to control for region and income




The purpose of our empirical exercise is estimate the impact of FDI on growth and to
examine the channels through which FDI can bring welfare gains to the recipient country.
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the data. The data reflects a high cross
country variation in the shares of FDI in GDP; FDI inflows in Singapore are 47 times
that of South Africa, while on average, FDI represents 1.76 percent of GDP. The highest
growth rate over the 1975-2000 period was attained by South Korea (6.081), while Nicaragua
experienced the lowest negative growth rate (-3.052). China’s spectacular development is
reflected in its growth rate (5.835% -the second highest in the sample) while its initial GDP
takes the second to last position in the ranking. Regarding human capital, the educational
attainment level in Malawi represent 3% of the U.S. level. Table 4.2 presents the correlation
matrix for the data averaged over the 1975-2000 period.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics. Based on a sample of 69 countries using the average over
the 1975-2000 period. Variables GDP1975, I rate, PC, Trade, Oil, and Agriculture are included in
regressions as logarithms.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth 1.890 1.683 -3.052 6.081
GDP 1975 8.532 0.885 6.435 9.922
School 1.827 1.042 0.167 4.576
I rate 2.795 0.411 1.907 3.789
Private credit -1.150 0.703 -3.314 0.311
Trade 3.506 0.735 1.536 5.646
Oil -0.867 2.059 -8.726 3.050
Agriculture 1.123 1.373 -3.428 3.548
FDI 1.764 1.637 0.042 10.107
We estimate the effects of FDI on economic growth after controlling for other growth
determinants. Thus the regression equation for the cross section data of 69 countries is given
by:
GROWTHi = β0 + β1 log GDP1975i + β2CONTROLSi + β3FDIi + ǫi (4.1)
The set of control variables consists of investment rate, human capital, financial devel-
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Table 4.2: Correlation matrix. Based on a sample of 69 countries using the average over
the 1975-2000 period. Variables GDP1975, I rate, PC, Trade, Oil, and Agriculture are included in
regressions as logarithms.
Variable Growth GDP1975 School I rate PC Trade Oil Agric FDI
Growth 1.00
GDP1975 -0.02 1.00
School 0.26 0.75 1.00
I rate 0.46 0.63 0.63 1.00
PC 0.41 0.54 0.58 0.68 1.00
Trade 0.16 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.49 1.00
Oil 0.06 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.26 1.00
Agric -0.09 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 1.00
FDI 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.26 0.58 0.32 -0.06 1.00
opment indicator, openness to trade, agricultural exports, and natural resource abundance
(oil exports) of the host country.
Previous studies explored the channels through which FDI may speed up growth by
analyzing the interaction between FDI and other determinants of economic growth. Thus, we
first linearly interact FDI with five different measures for absorptive capacity. We estimate
five additional regression equations corresponding to the interaction terms that are added
as explanatory variables: FDI x Financial markets, FDI x Trade, FDI x Schooling, FDI x
Oil, and FDI x Agriculture. The interaction terms are the regressors used for testing the
significance of those local conditions that ease the absorption of foreign technologies and
thus, complement FDI in creating welfare gains in the receiving country. Both FDI and
the measure for absorptive capacity are included as well in the new regressions, to avoid
the omitted variables problem. Thus, the regressions that estimate the effect of absorptive
capacity (ABSCAP) on FDI spillovers and implicitly, on growth are given by:
GROWTHi = β0 + β1FDIi + β2(FDIi ∗ABSCAPi) + β3ABSCAPi + β4CONTROLS + ǫi
(4.2)
We then account for continent and level of development by adding fixed factors for
region and income levels to the regressions. In this sense, dummy variables for Sub-Saharan
and Latin American countries are added to control for region, while dummy variables for
developing and high income OECD countries are used to control for levels of development.
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Finally, we carry out a unified study of absorptive capacities to evaluate the mix of
necessary conditions that are required for FDI to increase the growth rate. We test the
robustness of the five measures for absorptive capacity relative to each other. Thus we
estimate ten regression equations that contain two interaction terms at a time:
GROWTHi = β0 + β1FDIi + β2(FDIi ∗ ABSCAP1i) + β3(FDIi ∗ ABSCAP2i)
+β4ABSCAP1i + β5ABSCAP2i + β6CONTROLS + ǫi (4.3)
The purpose of this exercise is to analyze the combinations of factors that would generate
the highest payoffs from FDI for a receiving country. The previous literature has showed
that a threshold level of human capital or well developed financial markets are essential for
FDI to bring beneficial effects on the host economy. Yet, in this study, we are interested in
finding out how a simultaneous interaction of this factors with FDI might change the impact
of foreign investments on growth.
4.2.3 Results
The results confirm without exception the significant impact of initial levels of income,
human capital and investment rates on economic growth. The coefficients of these regressors
are all positive and strongly significant at 5% level.
FDI has a positive and significant effect on growth rate of GDP per capita even when
absorptive capacities are not taken into consideration. Our estimates of the regression
equation (4.1) are presented in column (1) of Table 4.3. The results indicate that the
regression coefficient for FDI (0.224) is significant at 10% level, suggesting that a 1 %
increase in the share of FDI in GDP is associated with 0.224 % increase in the growth rate
of GDP per capita. The coefficient for financial development indicator (private credit) is
positive and statistically significant at 10% level, such that a 1% increase in private credit
increases the growth rate by 0.05%.
The estimation results of equation (4.2) are reported in columns (2), (3), (4), and (5)
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of Table 4.3. The estimates highlight the positive effect of FDI on the growth rates of
recipient countries when absorptive capacities are taken into consideration. After adding
the interaction term between FDI and financial development indicator, the contribution of
FDI to growth more than doubles at 5% significance level. The interaction term FDI x Fin
enters positively (0.334) and it is statistically significant at 5% level, confirming that well
developed financial markets are vital for FDI to enhance growth. When FDI x Agric is added
in the regression, the coefficient for FDI increases (0.305) and remains significant at 5%, but
the coefficient of the interaction term, although not significant, is negative, suggesting that
FDI is growth enhancing in economies where the share of agricultural exports in GDP is
low. Although not significant, the coefficients for FDI remain positive when FDI is interacted
with oil exports and human capital, while the interaction with trade brings a negative (but
insignificant) impact of FDI on the convergence rate of the host country.
Fixed factors that control for region and level of income are added in regression equation
(4.2) along with linear interaction terms . The results are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
The coefficient estimates of dummy variables for developing and high income OECD coun-
tries are negative and insignificant. However, after adding dummy variables for income levels
in regressions, the coefficient for FDI becomes significant not only when FDI is interacted
with private credit and agriculture, but also when the the absorptive capacity is proxied by
human capital endowment and trade openness. Moreover, after we regress FDI x School
on growth rate, both the coefficient of FDI (0.044) and the coefficient on the interaction
term (0.071) are significant at 5% level and positive. These results confirm the findings
of the previous literature that FDI induces growth in countries that have sufficiently high
endowments of human capital.
We then add continental dummies for Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries in the
regression equation (4.2). The regression results are presented in Table 4.5. The coefficients
for both dummy variables suggest that location brings a penalty to the growth rates of
African and Latin American countries. We then add continental dummies for Sub-Saharan
and Latin American countries in the regression equation (4.2). The regression results are
presented in Table 4.5. The coefficients for both dummy variables suggest that location
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brings a penalty to the growth rates of African and Latin American countries. The growth
rates of Latin American countries are 0.96% lower than of the rest of the world when FDI
is interacted with financial development. Adding the interaction term between FDI and
Agriculture brings down the growth rates of Latin American countries even lower (they are
1.11% lower than the growth rates of the rest of the sample).
In both of these two cases, the coefficients for Latin America dummies are significant at
5% level.
Since agriculture accounts for an important fraction of GDP in Sub-Saharan countries,
we analyze the way in which the volume of agricultural exports affects the relationship
between FDI and growth in African countries. Column (2) in Table 4.5 shows that the
interaction term FDI x Agriculture enters negatively, while the coefficient for FDI (0.362)
is positive and significant at 5% level. This result suggests that the lower the agricultural
intensity in Sub-Saharan countries, the higher the contribution of FDI to growth. In this
case, the dummy coefficient for Sub-Saharan countries (-0.901) indicates that their growth
rates are 90% lower than of the reference group.
Our results suggests that natural resource abundance does not influence significantly
FDI’s effect on growth. When absorptive capacity is proxied by the volume of oil exports,
the coefficients of both FDI and interaction term become insignificant whether we add con-
tinental and income dummy variables or not.
Finally, we test the robustness of these five measures of absorptive capacity relative to
each other. We construct pairs of absorptive capacities and we regress their simultaneous
interaction with FDI on the growth rate of GDP per capita. The regression equation is given
by (4.3). Table 4.6 reports the estimated coefficients for FDI and for the pair of interaction
terms considered in each regression. The first column presents the regression coefficients for
FDI and interaction terms when FDI x Fin is regressed successively with FDI x Schooling,
FDI x Oil, FDI x Agriculture, and FDI x Trade, respectively. In the second column, FDI x
Schooling is regressed together with FDI x Oil, FDI x Agriculture and FDI x Trade- one at
a time. The third column reports the interaction of FDI x Oil with FDI x Agric and FDI x
Trade.
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Table 4.3: FDI and per capita GDP growth: effects of different measures of absorptive capacity on growth The dependent
variables are the average of per capita GDP growth rates from 1975 to 2000. Control variables: GDP1975=initial GDP per capita; Schooling=educational
attainment; I rate=investment rate, PC=private credit as % in GDP; Trade=total trade as % of GDP; Oil=oil exports as % of GDP; Agriculture=agricultural
exports as % in GDP; FDI=share of FDI in GDP. Variables GDP1975, I rate, PC, Trade, Oil, and Agriculture are included in regressions as log(variable).
P-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Independent variable FDI x Fin (PC) FDI x Agriculture FDI x Oil FDI x Schooling FDI x Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP1975 -1.420 −1.296
∗∗∗
−1.440∗∗∗ −1.403∗∗∗ −1.423∗∗∗ −1.391∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.606∗∗ 0.642∗∗ 0.542∗∗ 0.612∗∗ 0.524 0.629∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.038) (0.018) (0.181) (0.016)
I rate 2.123∗∗∗ 1.820∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.158∗∗∗ 1.976∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PC 0.540∗ 0.158 0.559∗ 0.552∗ 0.547∗ 0.571∗
(0.100) (0.704) (0.088) (0.095) (0.099) (0.086)
Trade -0.265 -0.358 -0.235 -0.247 -0.273 -0.399
(0.412) (0.274) (0.465) (0.449) (0.403) (0.278)
Oil 0.001 -0.014 0.005 -0.053 -0.000 -0.000
(0.987) (0.859) (0.950) (0.670) (0.997) (0.995)
Agriculture -0.067 -0.118 0.122 -0.069 -0.066 -0.076
(0.575) (0.340) (0.546) (0.563) (0.584) (0.527)
FDI 0.224∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.179 0.110 -0.196
(0.077) (0.029) (0.036) (0.227) (0.796) (0.722)
FDI x absorptive capacity 0.334∗∗ -0.098 0.031 0.055 0.088
(0.045) (0.249) (0.557) (0.782) (0.436)
R2 -adjusted 0.409 0.420 0.413 0.403 0.400 0.406
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69
∗∗∗ represents significant at 1% level;∗∗ represents significant at 5% level; ∗ represents significant at 10% level
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Table 4.4: FDI and per capita GDP growth: effects of different measures of absorptive capacity on growth. Fixed
factor added: dummy for high income OECD countries The dependent variables are the average of per capita GDP growth rates from
1975 to 2000; P-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Independent variable FDI x FIN FDI x AGRIC FDI x OIL FDI x SCHOOL FDI x TRADE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP1975 0.340
∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.683∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.659∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗
(0.012) (0.029) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014)
I rate 1.770∗∗∗ 2.238∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
PC 0.251 0.595∗ 0.579∗ 0.590∗ 0.608∗
(0.571) (0.086) (0.098) (0.096) (0.087)
Trade -0.360 -0.287 -0.302 -0.321 −0.406∗
(0.293) (0.400) (0.386) (0.351) (0.079)
Oil -0.007 0.012 -0.022 0.007 0.007
(0.935) (0.883) (0.865) (0.937) (0.936)
Agriculture -0.098 0.133∗ -0.061 -0.055 -0.062
(0.459) (0.057) (0.636) (0.674) (0.630)
FDI 0.412∗ 0.272∗ 0.168 0.044∗∗ −0.141∗∗
(0.052) (0.069) (0.269) (0.019) (0.010)
FDI x absorptive capacity 0.291 -0.100 0.018 0.071∗∗ 0.070
(0.257) (0.246) (0.759) (0.043) (0.563)
Developing countries dummy -0.411 -0.851 -0.775 -0.810 -0.670
(0.700) (0.392) (0.460) (0.427) (0.527)
High income OECD dummy -0.674 -1.051 -0.958 -1.054 -0.924
(0.495) (0.263) (0.329) (0.268) (0.339)
R2 -adjusted 0.405 0.406 0.392 0.393 0.395
Observations 69 69 69 69 69
∗∗∗ represents significant at 1% level;∗∗ represents significant at 5% level; ∗ represents significant at 10% level
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Table 4.5: FDI and per capita GDP growth: effects of different measures of absorptive capacity on growth. Fixed
factors added: dummies for Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries The dependent variables are the average of per capita GDP
growth rates from 1975 to 2000. Control variables: GDP1975=initial GDP per capita; Schooling=educational attainment; I rate=investment rate, PC=private
credit as % in GDP; Trade=total trade as % of GDP; Oil=oil exports as % of GDP; Agriculture=agricultural exports as % in GDP; FDI=share of FDI in
GDP. Variables GDP1975, I rate, PC, Trade, Oil, and Agriculture are included in regressions as log(variable). P-values are in parentheses below coefficient
estimates.
Independent variable FDI x FIN FDI x Agriculture FDI x Oil FDI x Schooling FDI x Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP1975 −1.152
∗∗∗
−1.217∗∗∗ −1.203∗∗∗ −1.189∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.514∗∗ 0.412∗ 0.483∗ 0.569 0.490∗
(0.045) (0.100) (0.059) (0.147) (0.059)
I rate 1.331∗ 1.883∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗ 1.534∗∗ 1.503∗∗
(0.057) (0.009) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034)
PC 0.030 0.293 0.309 0.261 0.315
(0.942) (0.389) (0.372) (0.458) (0.379)
Trade -0.392 -0.348 -0.322 -0.367 -0.401
(0.250) (0.304) (0.354) (0.285) (0.272)
Oil -0.019 -0.007 -0.067 -0.010 -0.009
(0.816) (0.922) (0.581) (0.906) (0.908)
Agriculture -0.161 0.061 -0.131 -0.136 -0.130
(0.193) (0.756) (0.280) (0.269) (0.282)
FDI 0.448∗∗ 0.362∗∗ 0.219 0.411 0.085∗
(0.033) (0.017) (0.166) (0.376) (0.089)
FDI x absorptive capacity 0.260∗ -0.101 0.034 -0.064 0.038
(0.097) (0.225) (0.529) (0.758) (0.753)
Sub-Saharan dummy -1.030 -0.901 -1.055 -0.952 -1.003
(0.125) (0.177) (0.125) (0.159) (0.143)
Latin America dummy −0.967∗∗ −1.110∗∗ −1.073∗∗ −1.138∗∗ −1.042∗∗
(0.048) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.039)
R2 -adjusted 0.447 0.450 0.439 0.436 0.436
Observations 69 69 69 69 69
∗∗∗ implies significant at 1% level;∗∗ implies significant at 5% level; ∗ implies significant at 10% level
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The coefficient for FDI is positive (0.571) and significant at 5% level when FDI is inter-
acted simultaneously with both the financial market indicator and human capital. While
FDI x Fin enters positively in the regression and is statistically significant at 5%, the coeffi-
cient for FDI x Schooling although insignificant, is negative. This surprising result suggest
that well developed finacial market might make up for a low endowment of human capi-
tal, such that overall, FDI might have a positive and significant impact on growth. Thus,
positive spillovers from FDI may coexist with a lower human capital endownment if the
condition for well developed financial markets is met in the host country.
We then analyze simultaneously the conditions on natural resource abundance and de-
velopment of financial markets that are required for generating positive effects of FDI on
growth. The coefficient estimate for FDI is positive (0.491) and significant when FDI x
Fin and FDI x Oil enter the regression. However, even though both interaction terms are
insignificant, the coefficient for FDI x Oil is negative, suggesting that natural resources abun-
dance might inhibit the benefits from FDI. Thus gains from FDI materialize in a country
that is relatively scarce in natural resources but has well developed financial markets
A similar situation is found when FDI x Fin is interacted with FDI x Agriculture. The
coefficient for FDI is strongly significant at 1% level and positive (0.685). While the coeffi-
cient for FDI x Fin is significant and positive, the coefficient for FDI x Agriculture is also
significant but negative (-0.150). Thus, countries with well developed financial markets and
low shares of agricultural exports in GDP increase their welfare through FDI from FDI.
When FDI x Trade enters the regressions, the coefficients for FDI become negative with
one exception: when FDI x Trade is combined with FDI x Fin, the coefficient for FDI is
positive but insignificant. However, when FDI x Trade is regressed together with FDI x Oil,
FDI is significant at 1% level and negative. This suggests that the growth of oil abundant
countries that trade intensively might slow down when MNC’s invest in their markets.
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Table 4.6: Robustness of absorptive capacities relative to each other: growth effects of simultaneous interactions
between absorptive capacities and FDI The dependent variable is the average of per capita GDP growth rates from 1975 to 2000. Control
variables: GDP1975=initial GDP per capita; Schooling=educational attainment; I rate=investment rate, PC=private credit as % in GDP; Trade=total trade
as % of GDP; Oil=oil exports as % of GDP; Agriculture=agricultural exports as % in GDP; FDI=share of FDI in GDP. P-values are in parentheses near
coefficient estimates.









FDI 0.491∗(0.085) 0.068(0.875) 0.179(0.227)
FDIxFin 0.351(0.197)
FDIxSchool 0.053(0.789)
FDIxOil -0.007(0.901) 0.031(0.562) 0.031(0.557)
FDIxAgric




FDIxAgric −0.150∗(0.089) -0.097(0.265) -0.096(0.263) -0.098(0.249)
FDIxTrade





FDIx Trade -0.042(0.787) 0.086(0.469) 0.082(0.609) −0.115∗∗∗(0.004) 0.088(0.436)
∗∗∗ implies significant at 1% level;∗∗ implies significant at 5% level; ∗ implies significant at 10% level
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4.3 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the necessary local conditions that enable FDI to generate welfare
gains in host countries. The mix of these local conditions defines the absorptive capacity.
The relationship between FDI and economic growth is shaped by absorptive capacities
that consist of development of financial markets, endowment of human capital, trade open-
ness, agricultural intensity and natural resources abundance.
We first focus on the relationship between FDI and other growth determinants by con-
structing linear interaction terms between FDI and different measures for absorptive capac-
ity. Using a cross section of 69 countries we regress FDI and these individual interaction
terms on the growth rate of GDP per capita after controlling for other growth determinants.
We find that the contribution of FDI to economic growth is positive and significant Our
results indicate that a minimum level of human capital and well developed financial markets
are essential for positive spillovers from FDI to exist.
The second exercise consists of a unified study of absorptive capacities that tests the
robustness of the linear interaction terms previously constructed relative to each other. The
results suggest that the most favorable economic environments for FDI are represented by
countries with well developed financial markets that are either relatively scarce in natural
resources or have low shares of agricultural exports in GDP. The condition of having well
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Derivations for Chapter 2: Labor
Market Equilibrium
In equilibrium, nominal wages are equalized such that wLi = wL and wHi = wH for i ∈ (0, 1).
Step 1: Get Li, Hi as functions of (wL, wH ,
∫ 1
0
A(i, h), KY )
Using (2.10) and (2.11) the variety specific demands for unskilled labor Li and human
capital Hi are expressed as functions of nominal wages and appropriate technologies:



























In order to express Li and Hi as functions of nominal wages and technologies, we use the
















Next, we derive the variety specific demand for skilled labor Hi by substituting (4.4) into
















Step 2: Use the labor market resource constraints L =
∫ 1
0





to get wL = wL(L,H,
∫ 1
0
A(i, h), KY ) and wH = wH(L,H,
∫ 1
0
A(i, h), KY ):





































We back out wH from (4.6) to substitute it into formula for H given by (4.7):
wH = α
−2
























































Substitute wL from (4.9)into (4.8) to get the equilibrium nominal wage wH .
Thus,
wH = α










Step 3: Get KX as a function of (H,L,
∫ 1
0
A(i, h), KY )
Next, we substitute the equilibrium nominal wages from (4.9) and (4.10) into the expres-
sion of KX given by (2.23).



























































Denote g(i) = A(i, h)
α














































Step 4: Get Y as a function of (H,L,
∫ 1
0
A(i, h), KY )
Next, we substitute the equilibrium nominal wages from (4.9) and (4.10) into the explicit



























































































Therefore, in equilibrium, the aggregate income Y is expressed as:












Derivations for Chapter 2: Share of
Industry i in GDP


















































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Comparison of TFP values with Hall and Jones (1999)’ estimates -case of a
closed economy
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 in GDP for Ghana
 Shares of X
i
 in GDP for U.S.
Figure 4.2: Shares of industries in GDP (%)for Ghana and for U.S.
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Appendix 3. Supplementary
Derivations for Chapter 3: Solution of
the Model for a Developed Country
The outcome of Bertrand competition in a developed country is summarized in Figure 4.3.
A foreign competitor faces three possible options:
1. Ad(i, hd) = Af,d(i, hf )
In the case of a technological match, both firms use an identical technology. Using the
expressions for technologies and given that hd > hf , we derive the threshold industry
i∗ starting from which foreign firms take over the market. Thus, i∗ =
√
hdhf .
2. Ad(i, hd) > Af,d(i, hf )
In this case, the foreign technology is inferior to the domestic technology. This implies
that MCd < MCf . In other words, the domestic competitor has the advantage of









Since a developed country is abundant in human capital, the foreign competition will
be edged out from complex industries i ∈ (i∗, 1).
3. Ad(i, hd) < Af,d(i, hf ) In low tech industries i ∈ (0, i
∗), a foreign firm might dominate
technologically a domestic firm. In this situation, the foreign producer chooses to set
its price equal to the marginal cost of the domestic firm which ensures its full control
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) − domestic technologies (rich country, high h=0.7)





























      −FDI threshold −
i*
Figure 4.3: Interaction of domestic and foreign technologies in a developed country










Therefore, the range of industries that form the intermediate goods sector is divided into
two regions: on (0, i∗) foreign firms supply Xif units of low tech intermediate goods, while
on (i∗, 1) domestic producers supply the market with Xid units of hi-tech goods.
Final good sector












Final goods producers’s maximization problem is given by:









− (r + d)KY
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= 0) yield the conditional demands for inputs




















• Domestic intermediate goods producers
The domestic firm’s maximization problem is given by:
πd = pdXid − C(wLd, wHd, Xid)






= 0) yield the nominal wages wLd and
















































Xid − MCd = 0
The conditional demand for Xid from (4.20) is used in the equation from above to
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calculate profits per unit:




= α(1 − α)K1−αY X
α−1
id
We calculate the profits earned by the domestic producer as πd = (MCf − MCd)Xid:




id = (1 − α)α
1




































Domestic capital investments in appropriate technologies are derived by summing up




F di di =
1
1 + r


















• Foreign intermediate producers
Foreign producers supply Xif over the range (0, i
∗) and charge a price pf = MCd.
They maximize their profits with respect to inputs Lif and Hif , and output Xif
πf = pfXif − C(wLf , wHf , Xif )






= 0) yield the nominal wages wLf and wHf
and the explicit demand for Xif :
wLf = δαK
1−α






wHf = (1 − δ)αK
1−α


























Xif − MCf = 0
Since the profits of the domestic producer are πf = (MCd − MCf )Xif , then:


















We use the calculated expression for foreign profits to back out the setup cost F fi from
























Foreign direct investments in appropriate technologies are determined by summing up




























General equilibrium requires that both the capital allocation condition and the labor market
equilibrium condition have to be met.
Labor market equilibrium:






























We use the equation from above to express Lid and Hid as functions of nominal wages and










































Next, Hif is substituted into (4.27):
wLf = δ(1 − δ)
α(δ−1)














We use the equation from above to express Lif and Hif as functions of nominal wages and






























1−α Af,d(i, hf )
α
1−α KY (4.35)










In equilibrium, nominal wages are equalized, therefore wLd = wLf and wHd = wHf .
Labor market equilibrium implies that the unskilled respectively, skilled labor employed by




































































































F di di =
1
1 + r










































In order to determine the domestic investments in appropriate technologies and FDI, we
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1−α = f(i) and Af,d(i, hf )
α
1−α = g(i). Since
∫ i∗
0
f(i)di = F and
∫ 1
i∗
g(i) = G, and
∫ i∗
0



















































































The final step is to solve for Y. We substitute the equilibrium nominal wages wL and wH













































Hence in equilibrium, the aggregate income is given by:



























We rewrite the expressions fro aggregate income, domestic investments, and FDI as:
Y = K1−αY L









LδH(1−δ)Bd [Z1 + W2]
1




(1 − α)αK1−αY L





(1 − α)αK1−αY L
αδHα(1−δ)Bαd Z1 [W1 + Z2]
−α (4.49)










































(A) Imperfect capital mobility (B) Perfect capital mobilty
Figure 4.4: TFP and capital per worker
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Appendix 4. Supplementary Tables
for Chapter 2 and Chapter 4
Table A-1: Data for Chapter 2: y= GDP per worker; KY
Y
= capital output ratio; H
N
=
human capital per worker; h= human capital intensity or appropriate human capital. (1 − α)=
share of capital in GDP. All variables are relative to U.S.










Argentina ARG 0.352 0.950 0.438 0.413
Australia AUS 0.715 1.100 0.580 0.740
Bolivia BOL 0.105 0.723 0.223 0.305
Botswana BWA 0.251 0.800 0.207 0.114
Brazil BRA 0.228 0.966 0.218 0.226
Canada CAN 0.736 1.118 0.768 1.037
Chile CHL 0.349 0.865 0.396 0.377
China CHN 0.116 0.841 0.184 0.257
Colombia COL 0.202 0.769 0.256 0.263
Costa Rica CRI 0.268 0.739 0.318 0.359
Cyprus CYP 0.584 0.868 0.520 0.477
Dominican Republic DOM 0.210 0.668 0.257 0.320
Ecuador ECU 0.147 0.892 0.359 0.365
El Salvador SLV 0.163 0.640 0.173 0.213
France FRA 0.683 1.116 0.432 0.467
Germany GER 0.657 1.129 0.453 0.559
Ghana GHA 0.053 0.589 0.050 0.062
Greece GRC 0.377 1.131 0.405 0.634
Guatemala GTM 0.156 0.608 0.116 0.125
Honduras HND 0.081 0.876 0.206 0.182
Hong Kong HKG 0.857 1.044 0.525 0.688
Hungary HUN 0.315 1.026 0.277 0.371
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India IND 0.086 0.703 0.127 0.182
Indonesia IDN 0.127 0.840 0.201 0.162
Israel ISR 0.654 1.010 0.517 0.635
Italy ITA 0.585 1.128 0.265 0.421
Jamaica JAM 0.145 0.981 0.247 0.104
Japan JPN 0.626 1.349 0.440 0.522
Kenya KEN 0.049 0.674 0.044 0.035
Malaysia MYS 0.380 0.962 0.254 0.272
Mexico MEX 0.262 0.996 0.405 0.344
Netherlands NLD 0.709 1.065 0.439 0.495
Nicaragua NIC 0.125 0.684 0.152 0.186
Pakistan PAK 0.084 0.634 0.192 0.268
Panama PAN 0.253 0.930 0.628 0.559
Paraguay PRY 0.177 0.774 0.277 0.289
Peru PER 0.143 1.056 0.405 0.497
Philippines PHL 0.142 0.809 0.492 0.631
Portugal PRT 0.484 1.031 0.278 0.345
South Korea KOR 0.441 1.186 0.907 0.988
Singapore SGP 1.158 1.216 0.309 0.265
Sri Lanka LKA 0.122 0.703 0.190 0.241
Sweden SWE 0.687 1.068 0.805 1.009
Switzerland CHE 0.741 1.241 0.540 0.628
Taiwan TWN 0.527 0.897 0.450 0.587
Thailand THA 0.196 1.206 0.262 0.263
Tunisia TUN 0.224 0.792 0.195 0.255
UK GBR 0.671 0.982 0.404 0.455
Uruguay URY 0.317 0.779 0.324 0.339
USA USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Venezuela VEN 0.238 0.929 0.289 0.353
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Table A-2: Chapter 2: TFP and its components B=exogenous part of TFP, Z=inter-
industry TFP. (1 − α)= share of capital in GDP. All variables are relative to U.S.
Country Country code B Z
1−α
α TFP = BZ
1−α
α
Argentina ARG 0.545 0.718 0.392
Australia AUS 0.856 0.943 0.808
Bolivia BOL 0.424 0.588 0.249
Botswana BWA 1.152 0.288 0.332
Brazil BRA 0.729 0.473 0.345
Canada CAN 0.894 1.003 0.896
Chile CHL 0.657 0.678 0.445
China CHN 0.497 0.520 0.258
Colombia COL 0.680 0.529 0.359
Costa Rica CRI 0.739 0.657 0.486
Cyprus CYP 0.849 0.781 0.663
Dominican Republic DOM 0.799 0.608 0.486
Ecuador ECU 0.295 0.664 0.196
El Salvador SLV 1.014 0.452 0.459
France FRA 0.920 0.772 0.710
Germany GER 0.867 0.847 0.734
Ghana GHA 1.487 0.195 0.289
Greece GRC 0.580 0.894 0.519
Guatemala GTM 1.665 0.308 0.513
Honduras HND 0.315 0.403 0.127
Hong Kong HKG 1.150 0.922 1.059
Hungary HUN 0.711 0.671 0.477
India IND 0.678 0.403 0.273
Indonesia IDN 0.537 0.369 0.198
Israel ISR 0.887 0.895 0.794
Italy ITA 1.253 0.727 0.911
Jamaica JAM 0.458 0.271 0.124
Japan JPN 0.696 0.819 0.570
Kenya KEN 1.405 0.140 0.197
Malaysia MYS 1.018 0.542 0.551
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Country Country code B Z
1−α
α TFP = BZ
1−α
α
Mexico MEX 0.417 0.639 0.266
Netherlands NLD 0.996 0.797 0.794
Nicaragua NIC 0.849 0.409 0.347
Pakistan PAK 0.458 0.536 0.246
Panama PAN 0.293 0.847 0.248
Paraguay PRY 0.543 0.566 0.307
Peru PER 0.219 0.798 0.175
Philippines PHL 0.253 0.892 0.226
Portugal PRT 1.082 0.639 0.692
South Korea KOR 0.402 0.999 0.401
Singapore SGP 2.013 0.532 1.070
Sri Lanka LKA 0.611 0.496 0.303
Sweden SWE 0.807 1.001 0.807
Switzerland CHE 0.774 0.891 0.689
Taiwan TWN 0.900 0.865 0.779
Thailand THA 0.405 0.529 0.214
Tunisia TUN 0.964 0.517 0.498
UK GBR 1.098 0.761 0.835
Uruguay URY 0.813 0.632 0.514
USA USA 1.000 1.000 1.000
Venezuela VEN 0.571 0.649 0.371
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Table A-3: Data for Chapter 4. Growth=average annual per capita growth rate; School-
ing=educational attainment; I rate=investment rate; PC=private credit as % in GDP; Oil=oil
exports as % of GDP; FDI=share of FDI in GDP. Variables I rate, PC, and Oil are reported as
log(variable).
Country Growth Schooling I rate PC Oil FDI
Algeria 1.258 1.127 2.940 -1.128 2.420 0.316
Argentina 0.528 1.607 2.821 -1.842 -1.122 1.448
Australia 1.928 3.197 3.147 -0.754 0.850 1.665
Austria 2.227 3.889 3.237 -0.231 -1.045 0.748
Barbados 3.252 3.084 2.586 -1.073 -1.223 2.652
Belgium 1.960 2.290 3.113 -0.898 1.064 8.496
Bolivia -0.134 1.119 2.202 -1.501 0.547 3.078
Brazil 1.434 0.690 2.985 -1.642 -2.228 1.275
Cameroon 0.868 0.606 2.071 -1.630 0.577 0.671
Canada 1.901 4.123 3.156 -0.733 1.050 1.756
Chile 2.886 1.582 2.765 -0.909 -2.410 3.116
China 5.835 1.610 2.919 -0.133 -1.519 1.911
Colombia 1.473 1.485 2.453 -1.947 -0.078 1.497
Costa Rica 0.831 1.193 2.733 -1.809 -2.240 2.394
Cyprus 5.278 2.461 3.177 -0.451 -0.628 3.448
Denmark 1.740 3.301 3.089 -0.892 0.112 1.958
Dominican Rep 2.870 1.014 2.625 -1.868 -1.138 1.933
Ecuador 0.221 1.525 2.896 -1.517 1.523 1.611
Egypt 3.395 1.204 2.098 -1.358 0.237 1.940
El Salvador 0.112 0.495 1.996 -2.744 -1.910 0.760
Fiji 1.243 1.153 2.636 -1.316 -8.726 2.278
Finland 2.205 2.724 3.220 -0.529 -0.202 1.175
France 1.749 2.472 3.175 -0.287 -0.569 1.051
Ghana 0.112 1.203 1.914 -3.314 -0.628 0.968
Greece 1.534 2.078 3.113 -1.066 -0.493 1.035
Guatemala 0.567 0.524 2.079 -1.977 -2.162 1.251
Honduras 0.345 0.722 2.564 -1.506 -2.897 1.302
Hungary 1.732 1.426 2.952 -1.250 -0.602 2.006
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India 3.512 0.888 2.477 -1.497 -3.012 0.195
Indonesia 3.985 0.856 2.761 -1.165 1.480 0.577
Ireland 4.640 2.600 2.963 -0.675 -1.225 3.636
Israel 1.740 2.112 3.246 -0.646 -2.822 0.864
Italy 2.024 2.329 3.108 -0.577 -0.661 0.339
Jamaica -0.366 1.506 2.751 -1.546 -1.116 1.607
Japan 2.506 2.856 3.454 0.005 -3.035 0.042
Jordan 2.428 1.782 2.738 -0.610 -4.389 1.371
Kenya 0.305 0.510 2.227 -1.549 0.178 0.512
Korea, Republic of 6.081 3.481 3.497 -0.796 -1.002 0.454
Malawi 1.281 0.167 2.482 -2.382 -5.160 0.620
Malaysia 3.977 1.615 3.145 -0.531 1.554 4.217
Mauritius 4.433 1.458 2.546 -1.159 -3.119 0.956
Mexico 1.347 1.574 2.907 -1.799 0.746 1.563
Netherlands 1.884 2.817 3.115 -0.344 1.899 2.992
New Zealand 0.657 3.042 3.032 -0.652 -1.161 3.252
Nicaragua -3.052 0.741 2.417 -1.317 -2.943 1.587
Norway 2.808 3.539 3.426 -0.751 2.776 1.188
Pakistan 2.753 1.290 2.441 -1.472 -2.591 0.515
Panama 1.580 1.740 2.947 -0.625 -0.401 2.343
Paraguay 1.609 1.224 2.550 -1.993 -4.135 1.099
Peru -0.333 1.773 2.863 -2.278 -0.543 1.446
Philippines 0.943 1.641 2.747 -1.319 -2.463 1.120
Portugal 2.684 1.489 3.053 -0.315 -1.112 1.518
Senegal 0.392 0.405 1.907 -1.276 0.294 0.836
Singapore 5.615 1.998 3.789 -0.233 2.951 10.107
South Africa 0.067 1.004 2.372 -0.680 -0.373 0.214
Spain 1.857 1.899 3.166 -0.274 -0.943 1.588
Sri Lanka 2.816 2.188 2.554 -1.705 -1.292 0.851
Sweden 1.519 4.155 3.031 -0.894 0.018 2.536
Switzerland 0.682 4.281 3.245 0.311 -2.679 1.942
Syria 2.929 1.186 2.579 -2.636 1.527 0.496
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Thailand 4.895 0.810 3.434 -0.567 -2.327 1.551
Togo -1.179 0.669 2.111 -1.486 -0.900 1.743
Trinidad &Tobago 2.006 2.238 2.386 -1.273 3.050 4.661
Tunisia 2.735 1.017 2.723 -0.677 0.943 1.949
Turkey 2.038 0.937 2.808 -1.929 -2.455 0.289
UK 2.006 2.331 2.881 -0.298 0.584 2.312
USA 2.307 4.576 3.003 -0.567 -1.550 0.900
Uruguay 1.852 2.018 2.522 -1.237 -3.612 0.742
Venezuela -0.936 1.424 2.812 -1.629 2.641 1.215
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